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I. Introduction
The Afghan mujahideen waged an impassioned and surprisingly
successful jihad against the Soviets in the early to mid 1980s. Much of that
success was due to the mujahideen's ability to neutralize the Soviet's Hind
helicopter with the versatile Oerlikon anti-aircraft gun.' The Oerlikon was a
$100,000 Swiss-made gun, purchased with Egyptian, Saudi, and American
money, channeled into Afghanistan by the Pakistanis, perched atop mountains
by Afghani mules-and negotiated for by Congressman Charlie Wilson of
1. GEORGE CRILE, CHARLIE WILSON'S WAR 438 (2003) (noting the effectiveness of the
mujahideen's weapons against Soviet aircraft).
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Texas.2 Congressman Wilson's righteous disregard for the rules, his network
of CIA insiders and international powerbrokers and his seat on the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee allowed him to circumvent the usual legislative
channels through which arms exports are executed. In fact, in many circles the
Afghan War came to be known as "Charlie's War":
3
Wilson was operating behind the lines like a bandit. He was... engaged in
the kind of sensitive diplomacy that is technically illegal for anyone other
than the White House to conduct: cutting arms deals with the defense
minister of Egypt; commissioning Israel to design weapons for the CIA;
negotiating all manner of extraordinarily controversial matters with the all-
important U.S. ally [Pakistani] General Zia.4
Simultaneously, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, along with a few other
high-ranking executive officials within President Ronald Reagan's
administration, secretly orchestrated aid to the Contra effort in Nicaragua and the
delivery of weapons into hostile Iran.5 This usurpation of arms export control by
the Executive became known as the "Iran-Contra Affair., 6 It was an episode in
which "Congress, the Cabinet, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were denied
information and excluded from the decision-making process. 7 These unilateral
initiatives were in direct conflict with U.S. public policy as defined by the
Secretaries of Defense and State8 and in violation of the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA).9 The balance of power between the Executive branch and Congress
that is designed to safeguard against potentially harmful foreign policies was
ignored to further the agenda of unelected administration officials.'
The power to define and implement the foreign policy of the United States
is divided between the President and Congress." The events described above
2. Id. at 246.
3. Id. at 376.
4. Id. at 374-75.
5. REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR, H.R. REP. No. 100-433, at 5-8 (1987) [hereinafter Iran-Contra Report] (chronicling the
events that led to the congressional investigation of the Executive's conduct towards Iran and
Nicaragua).
6. Id. at xv.
7. Id. at 16.
8. See id. (noting the administration's behavior was contrary to the foreign policy goals
of the Defense Department and State Department).
9. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2000). This statute controls the export of arms.
10. See Iran-Contra Report, supra note 5, at 19 (describing the consequences of the
administration's unilateral action).
11. Richard F. Grimmett, Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress, in
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: POWERS, STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES 15, 15 (N.O. Kura
64 WASH. &LEE L. REV 297 (2007)
demonstrate the consequences when either branch circumvents constitutional
channels to act unilaterally. In one instance, a Democratic congressman
dominated the United States' strategy on the Afghan war, leading to the transfer
of arms to a group who, fifteen years later, would become an enemy of the
United States.12  In another instance, several executive officials from a
Republican administration dishonestly and secretly coordinated two
controversial schemes "which undermined the credibility of the United
States." 13 These are extreme examples, but they illustrate perfectly why the
American system of governmental checks and balances extends beyond the
borders of the United States and into the realm of foreign policy. Whether
pertaining to international trade or negotiating treaties, "the roles and relative
influence of the two branches in making foreign policy differ from time to time
according to such factors as the personalities of the President and Members of
Congress." 14 At the same time, these branches "constantly interact and
influence each other."15
This Note will argue that an absence of effective checks in the current
structure of arms export regulation tilts the balance of power much too far in
the Executive branch's favor. The State Department, a key executive agency,
recently has taken a position on a regulation requiring the registration of arms
brokers that is contrary to the language of the regulation, Congress's intent, and
a judicial interpretation of the regulation. The checks and balances that were
designed to remedy such situations are either ineffective or inapplicable, thus
rendering the Executive's creation and execution of arms export controls
unrestrained. This imbalance has caused uncertainty and inconsistency within
the defense industry and threatens important policy objectives abroad.
In general, this argument is timely because it questions the unrestrained
use of executive power at a time when the Executive's use of constitutional
powers in matters such as warrantless surveillance and detainees' habeas status
is being widely criticized.' 6 This Note will make the argument by exploring the
ed., 2001).
12. See CRILE, supra note 1, at 507 (noting that the mujahideen from the Soviet-Afghan
war attacked a new enemy, the United States, on September 11, 2001).
13. Iran-Contra Report, supra note 5, at 11.
14. Grimmett, supra note 11, at 17.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., George F. Will, No Checks, Many Imbalances, WASH. POST, Feb. 16,2006,
at A27 (chronicling the administration's circumvention of congressional intent in justifying the
use of warrantless surveillance); Drake Bennett, Can Congress Matter?, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
15, 2006, at KI (describing the administration's use of"Caesar-like proclivities" to further its
agenda); Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power on Steroids, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2006, at A 16
(discussing the constitutional limits of executive power and questioning whether the current
INADEQUATE CHECKS AND BALANCES
friction between Congress's power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations"'" and "the... exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international relations,"'18 specifically in
regards to arms export control. It will do this by examining § 129.3 of the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR),19 a provision that requires
"persons, 20 who engage in brokering activities to register with the State
Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC). Section 129.3 is
ideal for this analysis for two reasons. First, the provision is narrow and new
enough that this Note will not become bogged down with a voluminous
discussion of its nuances or its legislative and administrative history.21 The
provision does not, however, stand alone. Its history and implementation
reflect broader foreign policies of both Congress and the Executive. The
conflict between congressional intent and agency interpretation of the brokering
registration requirement allows for an analysis of traditional tenets of
administrative procedure as well as a structurally-oriented outlook for the
future.
Second, § 129.3 is in a period of transition and uncertainty. Early in 2005,
defense contractors began to notice that applications for licenses to export
defense articles were being rejected by the State Department because the
applications listed foreign "brokers"22 who were not registered with the
23Department. Having never received formal guidance from DDTC, defense
contractors have traditionally interpreted the regulation's language to exclude
foreign persons located in foreign nations and have thus continued to work
through those brokers regardless of whether they are registered with DDTC.24
administration, in light of current events, has exceeded those powers).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
18. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); see also U.S.
CONST. art II, § 2, cl. I ("The President shall be Commander in Chief... of the United States.").
19. 22 C.F.R. § 129.3 (2006).
20. The question of who is included under the term "persons" is at the heart of the debate
over the registration of brokers.
21. See infra Part V.A. 1 (discussing the legislative history of the brokering amendment).
22. See 22 C.F.R. § 129.2(a) (2006) (defining a broker as "any person who acts as an
agent for others in negotiating or arranging contracts, purchases, sales or transfers of defense
articles or defense services in return for a fee, commission, or other consideration").
23. Client Alert, Powell Goldstein LLP, DDTC Begins Returning License Applications
Based on New Interpretation of Part 129 (June 28,2005), available at http://www.pogolaw.com
/files/news-alerts/1 565/ICA_6.20.05.pdf(notifying clients, especially defense contractors, of the
State Department's recent trend denying license applications).
24. See id. (observing that "virtually all" contractors use local brokers, some of whom are
not registered with the State Department).
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Until recently, that approach seemed to have met with DDTC's approval.
DDTC's recent interpretation of the brokering requirement, however, expanded
the scope of the "otherwise subject to" language arguably to include foreign
persons in foreign nations.
This Note is designed to tell the story of the troubling lack of checks and
balances that allows the State Department to proceed unfettered in its
interpretation of § 129. First, Part II of the Note will explain the structure in
which arms export controls are implemented from their beginnings in Congress,
to their adaptations in the State Department, and finally to their interaction with
private industry and trade. Also, Part II will explore how, since the AECA's
inception in 1976, administrations have viewed the use of arms export policy as
a tool to implement their broader foreign policy goals. Within the framework
outlined in Part II, Part III will delve more deeply into the current problem-
namely the State Department's changed interpretation of § 129. It will argue
that DDTC first interpreted § 129 as having a limited scope based on the
broker's "contacts 2 6 with the United States but now reads it to have a much
more expansive application.
Part IV steps back and analyzes basic notions of checks and balances as
they exist in today's four branch system of government.27 It argues that the
checks usually relied upon to counter the Executive's use or abuse of delegated
legislative authority, like the State Department's power under the AECA, are
either nonexistent or inapplicable to the current situation. This leaves the State
Department, for all practical purposes, unchecked in its interpretation of§ 129.
Unchecked power of this kind runs contrary to the Framers' reliance on checks
and balances.28 Part V argues that the absence of traditional checks is not only
troublesome to a formal understanding of separation of powers but is
25. See id. (noting the greatly expanded approach DDTC is now taking on the brokering
registration requirement).
26. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (developing the
"contacts" test based on due process concepts). The Court explained this due process concept as
follows:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. (citations omitted).
27. Independent and executive agencies are often thought of as comprising a fourth
branch of government. See, e.g., FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470,487 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) ("[Agencies] have become a veritable fourth branch of the Government .... ).
28. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) ("'There can be no liberty where the
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates'....")
(quoting Montesquieu).
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functionally harmful in the present situation because the State Department's
interpretation contravenes congressional intent and would not withstand review
by a court. Part V concludes that if such checks were available Congress and
the courts would act to remedy the situation.
Part VI sketches out a possible solution to the political imbalance. It
acknowledges that there are a variety of potential solutions, including a "wait
and see" approach and a judicial response, but it advocates a legislative
solution. More specifically, Part VI suggests that a thoughtfully designed,
narrowly applied legislative veto provision is the most appropriate response to
the imbalance of power. Part VI argues that the international trade of defense
articles occupies a unique niche in the constitutional division of powers such
that the current situation allows for an exception to the general rule precluding
legislative vetoes.29
II. An Overview ofArms Exports Processes, Regulations and Foreign
Policy Implications
The regulation of arms exports mirrors the structure in which most foreign
policy is implemented: Power is shared by Congress and the President.30
Although arms export regulation spans many decades, the Arms Export Control
Act passed by Congress in 1976 became the default organic statute and has
since "set the environment in which the State Department exercises its licensing
authority."' 1 The AECA begins by asserting that:
In furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the
United States, the President is authorized to control the import and the
export of defense articles and defense services and to provide foreign
policy guidance to persons of the United States involved in the export and
import of such articles and services.
32
The AECA authorizes two types of arms transfers: government-to-government
transactions and commercial transactions.33 This Note will concern itself only
29. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding that congressional veto
provisions are unconstitutional).
30. See IAN ANTHONY, ARMS EXPORT REGULATIONS 188-92 (1991) (noting that "the State
Department is the primary arms-export licensing authority" while "Congress has given itself an
important role in the arms export decision-making process").
31. Id. at 192.
32. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (2000).
33. Kendall Stockholm & Gerald McBeath, The Reasons Why: Examination of Three
Countries in the Business, in THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF ARMS 21,
28 (Peter C. Unsinger & Harry W. More eds., 1989).
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with the latter because the ITAR, specifically Part 129, are designed "to clarify
for industry the licensing procedures required. 34 Furthermore, the commercial
manufacturers of defense articles are the groups being harmed by DDTC's
current interpretation.
The State Department implements licensing requirements and procedures
under the authority that the AECA vests in the President.36 Each commercial
exporter must register with DDTC as a manufacturer and must subsequently
apply for written approval for each order it receives and plans to accept.
37
These applications and licenses may be suspended or revoked at any time by
DDTC and are subject to strict expiration dates.38 After a manufacturer submits
an application, the Office of Defense Trade Controls reviews it. Once the
application is through this initial step it is sent to other reviewing agencies for
comments and recommendations (for instance, the Defense Department for
national security review). 39 The application is then returned to DDTC for final
approval. That decision takes into account all interests, including U.S. foreign
policy considerations. 4° A more detailed analysis of the ITAR is beyond the
scope of this Note.41
The procedures outlined above reflect the foreign policy considerations of
Congress and the President. For example, when Congress passed the AECA in
1976, it reasoned:
Every nation, large or small, is concerned with its ability to defend itself If
weapons must be obtained from abroad, nations will take the necessary
steps to get them. The United States cannot stand aside from this process.
34. ANTHONY, supra note 30, at 195. Approximately eighty percent of U.S. arms exports
are transferred by the U.S. government. Commercial outfits account for the remaining twenty
percent. PAuL L. FERRARI ET AL., U.S. ARMs EXPORTS: POLICIES AND CONTRACTORS 46 (1987).
35. See Client Alert, supra note 23, at 1 ("This new and more expansive definition has led
to the increased returns of license applications.").
36. Allan E. Suchinsky, The Lawful Trafficking in Arms, in THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
AND ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF ARMs 73, 76 (Peter C. Unsinger & Harry W. More eds., 1989).
37. See ANTHONY, supra note 30, at 188-89 (outlining DDTC's approval process).
38. Id. at 190.
39. See Suchinsky, supra note 36, at 86 (charting the internal controls used by the DDTC
in reviewing export applications).
40. Id.
41. Many other sources provide a detailed analysis of arms export regulations. See, e.g.,
ANTHONY, supra note 30, at 188-95 (outlining the various roles played by the State Department,
the Commerce Department, the Defense Department, and Congress in arms export control);
FERRARI ET AL., supra note 34, at 45-53 (same); Suchinsky, supra note 36, at 75-91 (outlining
the same process with an emphasis on the interagency relationships in the licensing process).
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It should be willing to help, so far as its assistance is consistent with our
42own security and foreign policy interests.
This excerpt implies that if U.S. defense contractors are substantially obstructed
in trading with foreign nations, then those nations will go elsewhere to obtain
the weapons.
The foreign policy considerations inherent in the Executive's treatment of
arms export control are quite fluid and tend to ebb and flow with changing
administrations.43 Until 1989, a recurrent rationale for arms export control was
the Cold War and the spread of communism.44 The Carter administration,
which was the first Administration to execute arms export controls under the
AECA, asserted a more restrictive view of arms exports. "Arms transfers were
to be an 'exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used only in instances
where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our national
security interest."' 45  Following the Carter administration, the Reagan
administration, as one can imagine from the narrative in Part I, expanded the
role of arms exports into "'an essential element of its global defense posture
and an indispensable component of its foreign policy.',,
46
Since the Cold War's end, the sale of U.S.-made arms has remained an
integral part of U.S. foreign policy, but now for economic as well as political
reasons.47 President George H. W. Bush's policy was defined by the first Gulf
War.48 Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs H. Allen
Holmes stated that the Bush policy was one that relied on U.S.-arms exports to
further the Middle East peace process. 49 Despite President Clinton's stance on
42. H.R. REP. No. 94-1144, at 12 (1976). The House Report outlines the fundamental
justifications for passing a statute regulating and accommodating the import and export of arms.
43. See Stockholm & McBeath, supra note 33, at 31 ("[T]he politics of different
administrations have significantly influenced the direction.., of arms transfers."); see also
Grimmett, supra note 11, at 17-18 ("Throughout American history there have been ebbs and
flows of Presidential and congressional dominance in making foreign policy ... ").
44. See Stockholm & McBeath, supra note 33, at 31 (noting that countering the spread of
communism stabilized the strategic motive of arms export control).
45. Id. (quoting President Carter).
46. Id. at 32 (quoting the preamble of President Reagan's arms transfer policy directive).
47. See Janne E. Nolan, United States, in CASCADE OF ARMS: MANAGING CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS PROLIFERATION 131, 139 (Andrew J. Pierre ed., 1997) (summarizing the post-Cold
War perceptions of the George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations towards arms sales).
48. See ANTHONY, supra note 30, at 201 (noting that after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in
1990, President Bush reevaluated arms export policy).
49. See id. ("'[S]ecurity assistance... continues to ... support important U.S. interests
throughout all geographic regions, responding to an ever-changing world environment."')
(quoting Assistant Secretary Holmes).
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the larger issue of global weapons proliferation, his administration did "not
produce[] any discernible change in U.S. arms transfer policy.
50
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, much of President
George W. Bush's administration has focused on the proliferation of nuclear
technology and weapons of mass destruction,5' but the traditional trade of
defense articles still plays a critical role.52 The administration recognizes "the
sale, export, and re-transfer of defense articles and defense services as an
integral part of safeguarding U.S. national security and furthering U.S. foreign
policy objectives.5 3  A study by the Government Accountability Office,
however, concluded that since 2001, the administration has not made legislative
recommendations nor have they revised export control regulations. 4
The administration's goal, since 2001, is to balance the "urgent needs of
our battlefield allies"55 in Afghanistan and Iraq with the threat of American
defense articles and technology falling in the wrong hands.5 6 For example, the
State Department has made some efforts to "streamline and expedite" the
processing of license applications. 57 At the same time, however, the State
Department has adopted "more aggressive compliance standards"58 in order to
deal with the complicated and technologically sophisticated global "strategic
50. Nolan, supra note 47, at 139. President Clinton's Assistant Secretary of State for
Political-Military Affairs Robert Gallucci explained that "exports are essential to a strong state
for a strong economy.., there's no question we hope to promote exports." Id.
51. See, e.g., New Initiatives in Cooperative Threat Reduction: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. (forthcoming 2006) (statement of Robert G. Joseph,
Under-Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Security, Dep't of State) ("President Bush has given the
highest priority to combating WMD and missile proliferation .... ."), available at http://www.
state.gov/t/us/rm/60894.htm.
52. See John Hillen, Assistant Sec'y for Political-Military Affairs, Dep't of State, Address
to the 18th Annual Global Trade Controls Conference 4 (Nov. 3, 2005) ("Defense export
controls are an integral part of our broader security agenda... ."), available at http:// www.
pmdtc.org/docs/Hillen%20Speech.pdf.
53. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE DiREcToRATE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS AND THE
DEFENSE TRADE FUNCTION-AN OVERVIEW 1 (2006) [hereinafter DDTC Overview], available at
http://www.pmdtc.org/reference.htm#misc (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
54. U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-234, DEFENSE TRADE: ARMS ExPORT
CONTROL SYSTEM IN THE POST-9/11 ENVIRONMENT 12 (2005), available at http://www.
fas.org/asmp/resources/govem/1 09th/GA005234.pdf.
55. Hillen, supra note 52, at 5. For example, DDTC has implemented an expedited
licensing process for allies in Afghanistan and Iraq. Id.
56. See id. at 4 ("If defense cooperation is to be successful, it is imperative that shared
technology does not fall into the hands of those who would use it against us or our friends and
allies.").
57. U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 54, at 3.
58. Hillen, supra note 52, at 4.
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environment."59 Whatever specific initiatives the administration takes, President
Bush's policy is consistent with prior administrations' policies in that
"[a]uthorizations to transfer defense articles... , if applied judiciously, can help
meet the legitimate needs of friendly countries, deter aggression, foster regional
stability, and promote the peaceful resolution of disputes.
60
III. The Problem: A Changed Interpretation
The regulation of arms exports under the AECA and the ITAR is different
from other areas of trade control in that the "definitions are key to every
issue... [and] are not always intuitive.",61 The clarity and consistency of the
definitions of the terms in § 129.3 are very important to the manufacturers of
defense articles. The contested portion of § 129 is the language that establishes
the scope of the provision, which requires "[a]ny U.S. person, wherever
located, and any foreign person located in the United States or otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" to register with DDTC.62
Section 120.15 defines "U.S. person" and § 120.16 defines "foreign person,"
but "[persons] otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" is not
explicitly defined within ITAR.6 3 Therefore, practitioners and defense
manufacturers rely on their experiences with DDTC to formulate the meaning
of this language. 64
This Part explains the State Department's recent reversal of its
longstanding interpretation of the ITAR's broker registration provision.
Subpart A describes the previous interpretation and subpart B the current one.
As Parts IV and V will argue, the State Department's new interpretation
violates congressional intent and judicial precedent, but because of the absence
of checks on the Executive branch, it is immune to correction.
59. Id.
60. DDTC Overview, supra note 53, at 1-2.
61. Peter D. Trooboff, A Brief Primer on the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
("ITAR'), in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 317,319 (Evan R. Berlack & Cecil Hunt co-
chairs, 2000).
62. 22 C.F.R. § 129.3(a) (2006).
63. Trooboff, supra note 61, at 323.
64. See id. (noting the "apparent[]" meaning of the brokering requirement that has
developed in the defense industry); Client Alert, supra note 23, at 1 (explaining that exporters
rely on their own interpretations and experiences in defining the brokering amendment's scope).
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 297 (2007)
A. Previous Interpretation
In 1996, Congress passed an amendment to AECA requiring the
registration of arms brokers known as the brokering amendment.65 DDTC
implemented the new statutory requirement in 1997.66 As a result, § 129 does
not have as long a history of interpretation as other provisions of ITAR, which
were implemented shortly after the AECA became law in 1976. Between 1997
and early 2005, however, the definition of the "otherwise subject to" language
was interpreted by practitioners to encompass foreign persons who had some
minimum contact with the United States.67 A handbook published by the
Practicing Law Institute in 200068 contains a primer designed to help a
"company or lawyer who is new [to] the ITAR... to see [the] general approach
taken by [the] regulations. ''69 The primer notes that there has been no formal
guidance from DDTC on the issue and that "'[p]erson subject' is not defined
but it is apparently intended to be interpreted under personal jurisdiction
principles developed under the 'due process' requirements of the U.S.
Constitution, i.e., sufficient nexus with the United States based on the activities
in question.
70
An in-depth discussion of the minimum contacts test and its extraterritorial
application to foreign brokers is beyond the scope of this Note. In short, the
language was thought to apply to brokers who, for example, were employed by
U.S. companies, or had an unrelated business in the United States, but not to
foreign brokers whose "only contacts with the United States consisted of
telephone, facsimile and email communications." 7' DDTC seemed to acquiesce
65. See infra Part V.A (discussing the legislative history of the brokering amendment).
66. See infra Part V.A (detailing the legislative history of the brokering amendment).
67. See Trooboff, supra note 61, at 323 (suggesting the apparent scope of "otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States"); see also Client Alert, supra note 23, at 1
(noting that "many [defense] exporters applied some form of a 'contact' analysis" to determine
the scope of § 129.3); cf Philips S. Rhoads, The International Traffic in Arms Regulations:
Compliance and Enforcement at the Office of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Department of
State, in COPING wITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 813, 821 (Evan R. Berlach & Cecil Hunt co-
chairs, 2000) (acknowledging that the brokering amendment broadened the reach of the AECA
and ITAR, but it was unclear how far).
68. COPING wrIH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 317,319 (Practicing Law Institute, 2000). This
collection of practice guides is designed to "serve as an educational supplement" and as a
"reference manual" for attorneys. Id. at foreword.
69. Trooboff, supra note 61, at 321.
70. Id. at 323.
71. Client Alert, supra note 23, at 1 (noting that many approaches were used but most
included some sort of contact analysis). Another uncertainty was whether, when defining a
broker as one "who acts as an agent for others," 22 C.F.R. § 129.2(a) (2006) (emphasis added),
the requirement included independent contractors or applied the "common-law distinction
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to this interpretation by accepting license applications from exporters who had
submitted the application using the "contact" analysis. 72 Thus, until 2005,
"otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" was read, quite
literally, to apply to those foreign persons over whom the United States could
claim jurisdiction in a hypothetical legal dispute.73
B. Current Interpretation
As previously mentioned, in early 2005, exporters of defense articles
began to notice that license applications were being rejected because they did
not comply with § 129.3.74 DDTC has never issued any formal guidance on the
"otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" language before or
since these observations were made, but DDTC has clearly taken a broader
view.75 Not only is there empirical evidence observed by practitioners that
previously acceptable license applications have been rejected, but there is also
direct evidence that DDTC has broadened the scope of § 129.3. DDTC's
website provides a comprehensive resource center for exporters of defense
articles and lawyers in the field of defense trade.76 On a document intended to
provide an overview of DDTC's export requirements including the registration
of brokers, § 129.3 is read as requiring "U.S. and foreign persons engaged in
between an agent and an independent contractor." Trooboff, supra note 61, at 322.
72. See Client Alert, supra note 23, at I (suggesting that the exporters' contacts analysis
had previously been acceptable); Trooboff, supra note 61, at 323 (stating that the "otherwise
subject to" language was "apparently intended to be interpreted under personal jurisdiction
principles").
73. Another international trade practice guide, published in March 2005, suggests that the
original interpretation of "otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" was valid
when the authors wrote the article. Eric L. Hirshhorn, Controls on Exports, in 1 LAw &
PRACTICE OF UNITED STATES REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE booklet 9, 125 (Charles R.
Johnston ed., 2005). Hirshhorn's discussion of the registration of brokers limits the requirement
to U.S. persons and foreign persons located in the United States. Id. Although the article
contemplates that the provision will apply to business activities outside of the United States,
Hirshhom limits this extraterritorial application to United States citizens and does not mention
foreign persons in foreign countries. Id. at 125-26; see also Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 95 AM. J. INT'LL. 873,902 (2001)
(quoting former Under Secretary of State John Bolton, "Our brokering law is comprehensive,
extending over citizens and foreign nationals in the United States, and also U.S. citizens
operating abroad").
74. Client Alert, supra note 23, at 1 (notifying clients of DDTC's trend).
75. Id.
76. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS (2006),
http://www.pmdtc.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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arms brokering" to register with DDTC.77 This overview seems to read out the
limiting clauses "foreign person located in the United States 78 and "otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 7 9 Instead, the State Department
applies the provision to all persons, wherever located, who are engaged in
brokering. The questions of whether this interpretation is legal and whether it
is correct will be explored in Parts IV and V, respectively. This Part simply
illustrates DDTC's change in course from a literal, more limited, interpretation
of § 129 to an interpretation which expands the scope of the language to
include anyone engaged in brokering activities.
IV Executive Authority in Arms Export Regulation is Effectively Unchecked
The previous Part explained the State Department's sudden about-face in
its interpretation of § 129.3 of the ITAR. This Part argues that this shift could
be made unilaterally and persist unchallenged because of an alarming lack of
checks on executive action. Subpart A deals with the general expansion of
executive power in recent decades. Subpart B argues that executive autonomy
is even more pronounced in the context of arms export regulation.
The system of government designed by the Framers relies on a system of
checks and balances. 80  Every civics student learns, for instance, that the
President may veto legislation from Congress81 and that the courts may declare
acts of the Executive and Legislature unconstitutional.8 2 This Note examines
the State Department's treatment of congressionally delegated power; therefore,
it will focus on Congress's and the Judiciary's ability (or lack thereof) to check
the Executive's interpretation and execution of its delegated duties.
77. DDTC Overview, supra note 53, at 3.
78. 22 C.F.R. § 129.3(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
79. Id.
80. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) ("[T]he separation of
governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.");
THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) ("[T]he preservation of liberty requires that the three
great departments of power should be separate and distinct."). But see RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 2.1 (2002) ("Articles I, II, and III establish three Branches of
government, but they say little about the powers of each. Many of the powers overlap
functionally.").
81. See U.S CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall... be presented to the President of the United States.").
82. See Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
INADEQUATE CHECKS AND BALANCES
A. The Rise of the Administrative State and the Demise of the
Nondelegation Doctrine Eroded Constraints on the Executive Branch
Fifty years ago, Justice Jackson observed "The rise of administrative
bodies probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last
century .... They have become a veritable fourth branch of the Government,
which has deranged our three-branch legal theories .... How does this
"fourth branch" fit into a system that originally contemplated the inter-
relationships of three branches of government? 84 The answer to this question
has spawned volumes of scholarship, 5 and though a thorough analysis is far
beyond the scope of this Note, most answers probably include a discussion of
the delegation of legislative power from Congress to administrative bodies, and
86the Supreme Court's willingness to defer to such delegations.
The doctrine that "Congress is not permitted ... to transfer to others the
essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested,"8 7 also known as the
nondelegation doctrine, has not been used to invalidate a delegation of
legislative power since 193 5,88 and there is no sign that today's Supreme Court
is willing to resuscitate such a rule.89 In fact, the Court endorses such
delegations, stating that "our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical
understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job
83. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
84. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983) ("The very structure of the Articles
delegating and separating powers under Arts. I, II, and III exemplifies the concept of separation
of powers.... ."); see also Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the
Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 1-2 (1994) (questioning how a fourth branch of government can fit into our original
constitutional structure).
85. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, I ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE ch. 2 (1958)
(contemplating the role of administrative bodies in the constitutional system).
86. See, e.g., ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.1
(2d ed. 2001) (discussing the nondelegation doctrine); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 49-61 (4th ed. 2004) (same).
87. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935).
88. See id. at 551 (holding "the attempted delegation of legislative power... to be
invalid"); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,421 (1935) ("The Congress manifestly is
not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it
is thus vested.").
89. See WILLIAM F. Fox, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 42-43 (2000) ("The
Supreme Court has shown no particular affection for the doctrine."). But see id. at 31 (noting
that as an Associate Justice, William Rehnquist, suggested that the Court bring back the
nondelegation doctrine).
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absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives." 90 The
Court's "practical understanding" 9' recognizes the need for the delegation of
power to competent agencies since Congress has neither the expertise nor the
resources to deal with every solution to every problem. 92 Nonetheless, under a
formalist approach, the delegation of legislative powers to executive agencies
is, as Justice Scalia put it, an "unconstitutional delegation. 9 3 However, even
Justice Scalia concedes, "that no statute can be entirely precise, and that some
judgments, even some judgments involving policy considerations, must be left
to the officers executing the law and to the judges applying it."9 4 Whether
through a formalist or a functionalist perspective, congressional delegations of
power are here to stay,95 but questions about how to compensate for such
delegations remain.
To accommodate the "somewhat confused posture 9 6 of the separation of
powers doctrine and rebalance the lopsided powers among the three branches,
the Supreme Court and scholars of administrative law rely on several structural
checks. This subpart explores several of the checks as they apply generally to
administrative bodies; subpart B will analyze the checks as they apply to
international arms trade and specifically to the State Department and DDTC.
Justices and scholars often cite the judiciary as the most fundamental
check on the potential abuse of executive power.97 In a sense, the courts act-
albeit only in cases or controversies-to ensure that agency decisions are within
the boundaries set by Congress.98 For example, in INS v. Chadha, Chief Justice
90. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. See Fox, supra note 89, at 32 ("Congress cannot legislate with precision in all areas of
public interest.").
93. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see McCutchen, supra note 84, at
36 ("Under the formalist paradigm, open-ended delegations of legislative powers are
unconstitutional."); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States .. ") (emphasis added); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,529 (1935) ("Congress is not permitted... to transfer to
others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested."). But see PIERCE, supra
note 80, at 86 ("The Court probably was mistaken from the outset in interpreting Article I's
grant of power to Congress as an implicit limit on Congress' authority to delegate legislative
power.").
94. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. See McCutchen, supra note 84, at 36 ("Open ended delegations of legislative power
are here to stay.").
96. Fox, supra note 89, at 41.
97. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n. 16 (1983) (citing the ability ofthe court
to review an agency's decision or interpretation made pursuant to congressionally delegated
power).
98. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 86, at 119 (summarizing the judicial control of agency
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Burger relied on the limits set forth in the governing statute and the potential
for judicial review as sufficient checks on the delegation of legislative powers
to the Executive.99
[A]dministrative activity cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that
created it-a statute duly enacted pursuant to [Art. I, § 7]. The
constitutionality of the [agency's] execution of the authority delegated to
[it] .. . involves only a question of delegation doctrine. The courts, when a
case or controversy arises, can always "ascertain whether the will of
Congress has been obeyed," and can enforce adherence to statutory
standards.
100
The scope of judicial review, however, is often limited by standards of review
either in the agency's governing statute or the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).' 0' Even considering the numerous limitations on judicial review of
agency action, the process does further "the dual goals of assuring that agencies
act within constitutional limits and assuring that agency actions are consistent
with policy decisions made by the legislature." 
102
Because Congress was the branch that surrendered the "quasi-
legislative" 10 3 power to the Executive, Congress should have some meaningful
devices with which to check that power, and it does.' °4 First and foremost, if
Congress is unhappy with the way a particular agency is interpreting a
provision of a statute, the most obvious and sweeping solution is to rewrite the
legislation.'0 5 Second, if Congress does not feel full scale legislation is
necessary or possible, then it may issue a fast-tracked "resolution of
disapproval" (not subject to many procedural formalities such as the filibuster
in the Senate) to obtain a quick vote on a proposed rule. 10 6 Because the
discretion).
99. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16.
100. Id. (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944)); see also Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 ("The judiciary is the final
authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which
are contrary to clear congressional intent.").
101. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 86, at 122-23 (noting the limited scope of judicial
review regarding certain types of agency action).
102. Id. at 119.
103. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16 (quoting Humphrey's Ex. v. United States, 295 U.S.
602, 628 (1935)).
104. See Fox, supra note 89, at 43-44 (outlining the congressional devices used to police
agency discretion).
105. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 86, at 41 ("[A]gency decisions can be overruled by
passing legislation .. "); Fox, supra note 89, at 43 ("Congress has the ability to write elaborate
enabling acts, prescribing minute standards of agency behavior.").
106. See PIERCE ET AL.,supra note 86, at 515 (describing the process, adopted in 1996, by
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resolution does not require the President's signature, however, it neither
amends the proposed rule nor has the force of law.
10 7
The Legislative branch has various other checks on executive power in the
context of delegated authority; two powerful tools are Congress's political
oversight'0 8 and budgetary control.'09 Congress's political oversight includes
the power to investigate agencies by calling agency witnesses pursuant to
Congress's subpoena power.110 Political oversight also includes more informal
monitoring such as day-to-day contact between agency employees and members
of Congress or committee staff."' Budgetary controls "are often preferred
because... [they] need not undergo the lengthy committee process."
'"12
Agencies cannot function without money," 3 and Congress can (and does)
increase or decrease an agency's budget depending on whether Congress
approves of the agency's behavior." 1
4
One potentially efficient legislative check on the Executive's use of
delegated authority is the legislative veto." 5 The Supreme Court, however,
prohibited the use of this tool in 1983.116 This Part of the Note explores the
which Congress may review proposed rules).
107. See id. (outlining the strengths and weaknesses of congressional "resolutions of
disapprovals").
108. See id. at 41 (describing various ways in which Congress can "indirectly" shape
administrative decisions). Congress's structural oversight includes budgetary restraints,
oversight hearings, the ability to control the bureaucratic structure of agencies, and informal
contacts between members of Congress and the State Department. William N. Eskridge Jr. &
John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523,539-40 (1992).
109. See MICHAEL K. YOUNG, UNITED STATES TRADE LAW AND POLICY 27 (2001) (noting
the ability of Congress to influence administrative decisions with its funding power).
110. See Fox, supra note 89, at 44 (outlining the power of Congress to subpoena witnesses
and compel testimony).
111. See id. at 46 (discussing the day-to-day ways that Congress keeps tabs on agency
conduct).
112. Id. at 45.
113. Id.at47.
114. See id. ("The power to set an agency's budget may be as important as all the other
controls combined.").
115. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-68 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("[The
legislative veto is] a central means by which Congress secures the accountability of executive
and independent agencies."). The legislative veto was an extremely popular congressional tool
before the Chadha decision. Prior to 1983, "Congress had included 295 veto provisions in 196
different statutes." PIERCE ET AL., supra note 86, at 44; see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 968
(White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he legislative veto [was] placed in nearly 200 statutes. The device
[was] known in every field of governmental concern.").
116. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954-59 (holding that a provision mandating legislative
approval of decisions made by the Attorney General regarding the deportation of aliens was
unconstitutional because Congress failed to act in conformity with the constitutional
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status quo, and, therefore, does not consider the legislative veto as a current
check. Part VI of the Note will revisit the legislative veto as a potential
solution to the dearth of checks against Executive power.
B. Executive Constraints Are Weakest in Arms Export Regulation
This subpart argues that constraints on executive action are especially
weak in the area of arms export regulation. It first contends that traditional
judicial restraints on the Executive are ineffective in this context. It then shows
why the usual congressional checks are likewise inadequate.
International trade law is unique in that two of the three branches (the
Executive and the Legislative) derive their powers to influence international
trade from the Constitution itself." 7 "This constitutional division [of power] is
resolved in practice by Congress delegating certain power to the President."' 18
The preamble to the AECA explicitly delegates to the President the power to
control the export of arms pursuant to the limitations within the statute.'" 9
"[T]he President is authorized to control the import and the export of defense
articles and defense services and to provide foreign policy guidance to persons
of the United States involved in the export and import of such articles and
services."120
Such a delegation is valid if Congress has: (1) not left "important choices
of social policy" up to the agency, (2) provided the agency with an "intelligible
principle," and (3) "ensure[d] that courts charged with reviewing the exercise of
delegated legislative discretion will be able to test that exercise against
ascertainable standards."'12 1 Once Congress appropriately delegates control to
the Executive, any agency decision made under the delegated authority is
susceptible to judicial review, but it is also entitled to Chevron deference.
22
requirements for enacting legislation).
117. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text (noting the congressional power
explicit in Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 and the executive power explicit in Art. II, § 2, cl. 1).
118. YOUNG,supra note 109, at 28.
119. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (acknowledging the statutory language that
delegates the power to regulate arms exports to the President). The President further delegated
this power to the Secretary of State by Exec. Order No. 11,958, 3 C.F.R. 79 (1977).
120. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (2000).
121. AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
122. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (holding that an
agency's implementation of a statutory provision is entitled to Chevron deference if Congress
intended that agency action "carry the force of law," as is the case with Congress's explicit
delegation in the preamble to the AECA).
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The initial question under Chevron is "whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue." 123 If so, then the matter is over for the court and
the agency; Congress's intent must be followed. 24 If, however, Congress has
not directly addressed the question, the final step asks whether the agency's
construction is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."' 25 If
the agency's decision passes this low hurdle, then the court will give deference
to the agency's construction of the statutory provision.126
1. Judicial Review is Foreclosed
The preceding analysis presumes that judicial review of the administrative
action is available. The discretion given to the Executive in the AECA,
however, is bolstered because the delegation of the power to control the export
of defense articles is within the realm of international relations and has national
security implications. 127 This raises two separate and equally challenging
hurdles to meaningful judicial review. First, as discussed above, the regulation
of arms exports is a component, to one extent or another, of a President's
overall foreign policy,128 and in matters of foreign policy "' [t]he President is the
sole organ of the nation.""v 29 Thus, the President and his or her executive
agencies are given more deference than would be appropriate "were domestic
affairs alone involved.'
30
Second, under § 554(a)(4) of the APA, "the conduct of military or foreign
affairs functions"' 131 is precluded from APA review. 132 In fact, the ITAR and
123. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
124. Id. at 842-43.
125. Id. at 844.
126. Id.
127. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
("[C]ongressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry
within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and
freedom....").
128. See supra notes 42-60 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which arms
exports fit into administrations' general foreign policy goals).
129. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting John Marshall).
130. Id. at 320.
131. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(4) (2004).
132. Id. DDTC's interpretation of § 129.3 has, thus far, been informal and is therefore
excluded from review and the procedural requirements of the APA because of the reasons stated
above. This Note does not explore whether a formal interpretation from DDTC would be
reviewable.
316
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DDTC explicitly exclude agency action from APA review, relying on the
discretion given to the Executive in matters of foreign affairs. 1
33
Procedures for amending and revising ITAR ... [and the] administration of
[AECA] is a "foreign affairs function encompassed within the meaning of
the military and foreign affairs exclusion of the [APA]"; [DDTC] takes
[the] position that exercise of this foreign affairs discretion is "highly
discretionary" and, therefore, excluded from [APA] review.'
34
Because of the insurmountable obstacles inherent in arms export regulation,
one of the fundamental checks on executive power-judicial review-and thus
one of the branches of government-the Judiciary-are useless.
2. Congressional Controls Are Inadequate
Subpart A described four devices that Congress can use to counter
executive action. 35 This section argues that none of those tools is an adequate
check on executive autonomy in arms export regulation, and in particular on the
State Department's interpretation at issue here. First, although congressional
amendment of the AECA would certainly be an effective check on the State
Department's incorrect interpretation of § 129, it is neither a timely nor reliable
one. The process by which Article I legislation is enacted is cumbersome and
unpredictable. 136 The path by which a bill becomes law is fraught with pitfalls
133. See ITAR, 22 C.F.R. § 128.1 (2006) ("Because the exercising of the foreign affairs
function, including the decisions required to implement the [AECA], is highly discretionary, it
is excluded from review under the [APA]."); Amendments to the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 67,275 (Dep't of State Dec. 24, 1997) (final rule) ("These
amendments involve a foreign affairs function of the United States. They are excluded from
review under Executive Order 12866 (69 Fed. Reg. 51,735) and 9 U.S.C. § 553 and § 554, but
have been reviewed internally by the Department to ensure consistency with the purposes
thereof.").
134. Trooboff, supra note 61, at 321.
135. See supra Part IV.A (explaining four congressional oversight devices: Article I
legislation, "resolutions of disapproval," political oversight, and budgetary oversight). This list
is not exhaustive. There are other congressional tools that affect agency discretion, such as
changing an agency's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 89, at 43-48 (describing a more
complete list of congressional devices). The four devices in the text were chosen because of
their relevance to international trade and the State Department.
136. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of
Agency Rules, 51 DuKE L.J. 1059, 1076 (2001) (describing the congressional devices for agency
oversight that are less cumbersome than traditional legislation); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452,
508-09 (1989) (explaining "[t]he practical constraints that flow from the institutional structure
of Congress"). But see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) ("With all the obvious flaws
of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse [associated with Art. I, § 7 legislation], we have not
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and hurdles. 137 Not only must a bill survive the traditional obstacles associated
with lawmaking, but it must also compete with other legislation for committee
time and floor time, as well as meet with the approval of various individuals
such as committee and subcommittee chairmen and the leadership of each
House. 138 "The institutional obstacles to formal congressional response are
likely to be overcome only when the agency's position has incited widespread
or well-organized discontent, and most agencies are politically adept enough to
avoid taking many such extremely provocative actions.' 39 Without such
widespread disapproval, many contested agency interpretations are left wanting.
The second congressional device, the "resolutions of disapproval" that
Congress can issue regarding a proposed agency rule, are applicable only to
proposed "rules.' 40 Informal interpretations of a statutory provision, such as
the State Department's current stance on the brokering provision of the AECA,
will not qualify for this sort of congressional response. Furthermore, the State
Department is an executive department with a Cabinet level secretary who
serves at the behest of the President.' 4' "Thus, when the President has a firm
preference on the policy issue, that preference will often exercise a more
powerful constraint on the agency than congressional monitoring."' 142 In other
words, even if Congress officially disapproved of the State Department's
interpretation, it is unlikely to have any effect on that interpretation if the
President and the Secretary of State feel strongly about the issue.
Congress's political oversight 43 is an "integral part of the on-going
relationship between Congress and the agencies,"' 44 but is often restricted by
the interests of committee chairmen, leadership, and other individuals who have
the power to organize widespread support. 45 Additionally, political oversight
yet found a better way to preserve freedom.... ").
137. See, e.g., Schoolhouse Rock!: America Rock, I'm Just a Bill (Capital Cities/ABC
Video Pub. 1995) (chronicling the process of how a bill becomes law).
138. See Seidenfeld, supra note 136, at 1076 (noting factors that may inhibit the progress
of potential legislation).
139. Farina, supra note 136, at 509.
140. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 86, at 516 (noting that because resolutions of
disapprovals are only applicable to proposed rules they are "unlikely to have a significant
impact").
141. Albeit with the advice and consent of the Senate. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
142. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 108, at 539.
143. See supra Part IV.A (noting that this oversight includes the ability to conduct hearings
and investigations, as well as the informal contacts that occur between individual members of
Congress and agency staff).
144. Fox, supra note 89, at 46.
145. See Farina, supra note 136, at 509 (noting the difficulties associated with oversight
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is subject to constraints similar to those that affect "resolutions of disapproval."
The State Department is at the heart of the Executive branch and deals with
issues that heavily influence the President's foreign policy. Congress can have
all the hearings it wants, but at the end of the day the Office of Defense Trade
Controls answers to the Secretary of State who answers to the President. 1
46
The final congressional device, budgetary constraints, is often an effective
tool.147 Even this traditional tool, however, has a limited effect on the current
issue. The State Department performs such an integral role in foreign relations
and national security that suggesting a reduction in the department's budget as
a threat would be met with insurmountable disapproval-especially in the
realm of weapons control. To illustrate, President Bush's 2007 proposed
budget asks Congress to reduce spending in almost every area of government
except those areas associated with national security. 48 Since September 11,
suggesting cuts in programs with security implications is politically unwise.
Thus Congress is highly unlikely to propose cuts in DDTC's budget as
punishment for DDTC's inconsistent interpretation of § 129.149
In conclusion, the checks and balances that animate our system of
government are absent in the context of arms export regulation. Judicial review
is discouraged because of deference to the Executive and explicitly precluded
by procedural safeguards in the APA and within DDTC. Congress's traditional
oversight devices are also ineffective or limited. Article I legislation is
cumbersome and unpredictable. Congress's "resolution of disapproval" is not
applicable to informal interpretations and would probably fall on deaf ears at
the executively controlled State Department if it were available.
hearings and investigations); see also Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARv. L.
REv. 2245, 2259 (2001) (discussing the "factional characteristics" of those congresspersons with
the ability to organize hearings); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 108, at 539-40 (noting that
congressional oversight is often ineffective in swaying an agency).
146. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 108, at 539 (suggesting that the President's
preference will often take precedence in an agency under executive control).
147. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (discussing budgetary controls and
their effectiveness).
148. See Amy Goldstein, 2007 Budget Favors Defense: Medicare Takes Biggest Hit in
$2.7 Trillion Plan, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2006, at AO1 ("President Bush plans to propose a $2.7
trillion budget tomorrow that would shrink most parts of the government unrelated to the
nation's security while slowing spending on Medicare by $36 billion during the next five
years ... ."); see generally OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, OVERVIEW OF THE
PRESIDENT'S 2007 BUDGET 3 (2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pdf/overview-07.pdf
(outlining the President's budgetary agenda including the overarching emphasis on security
issues).
149. See, e.g., Ron Hutcheson, Government Spending Soaring; Close Up, SEA TLE TIMES,
Feb. 7, 2006, at A3 ("In the post-Sept. 11 world, national-security spending is virtually
sacrosanct in Congress.").
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Congress's political oversight is not an adequate solution. And budgetary
constraints are not likely to gain traction in a Congress that dare not
suggest reducing the appropriations of an office with national security
responsibilities. This set of ineffective restraints leaves the State
Department unchecked in their recent interpretation of § 129. Such
unfettered autonomy is a sharp departure from our government's
fundamental principle of checks and balances. 150
V. The State Department's Interpretation Contravenes Congressional
Intent and Would Fail Judicial Review
Part IV of this Note examined the ineffective checks and balances of
Congress and the judiciary against the Executive's use of delegated
power in the field of foreign affairs, and specifically arms export
regulation. This Part analyzes the deficiency as it relates to ITAR and
§ 129. As previously stated, the State Department's recent interpretation
of § 129.3 and the language "otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States" represents a change in course and has caused confusion
for the manufacturers of defense articles as they apply for new and
renewed licenses.15'
The absence of such checks, however, is harmless if such an
interpretation is consistent with congressional intent and able to
withstand judicial review, for in that case, neither Congress nor the
courts would object to or overrule DDTC's current interpretation.
Therefore, an important part of this Note proves, or at least suggests, the
opposite-the State Department's current interpretation is inconsistent
with congressional intent and would not withstand judicial review if
review were possible. In order to accomplish this, subpart A will
examine the legislative history of the brokering amendment and the
AECA. Subpart B will analyze DDTC's interpretation of § 129 as a
reviewing court would.
150. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) ("'There can be no liberty where the
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates' ....
(quoting Montesquieu)).
151. See supra Part III (explaining the previous interpretation of Part 129 and the recent
rejection of license applications due to unregistered consignees on the applications).
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A. The Congressional Intent and Legislative Purposes Are Contrary
to the State Department's Interpretation
DDTC promulgated § 129 in response to a congressional amendment
to the AECA. 5 2 In July 1996, Congress amended § 38(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the
AECA to require "every person who engages in the business of brokering
activities" to register with the State Department.153 This Note is concerned with
the question of to whom the brokering amendment applies; thus the only
language in the amendment that is pertinent to this analysis are the words
"every person."'154 Admittedly, the statutory language "every person," read
literally, suggests Congress intended to include any person, wherever located.
However, the legislative history of the brokering amendment and the foreign
policy objectives that guide arms export legislation in general suggest that
Congress did not intend a literal interpretation of this language.
1. The Legislative History of the Brokering Amendment Calls for a
Narrower Reading
The brokering amendment to the AECA passed in July of 1996.155 The
legislative history of the amendment provides what Professor Cass Sunstein
calls "interpretative instructions" to determine congressional intent.156 Little of
the legislative history is devoted specifically to the brokering amendment,157 but
what the legislative history lacks in bulk, it makes up for in substance. The
"instructions" that Congress did provide regarding the brokering amendment
152. 22 C.F.R. § 129.1 (2006) (stating the purpose of§ 129).
153. Defense and Security Assistance Programs Revision and Naval Vessels Transfer, Pub.
L. No. 104-164, § 151, 110 Stat. 1421, 1437 (1996).
154. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (b)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).
155. Defense and Security Assistance Programs Revision and Naval Vessels Transfer, Pub.
L. No. 104-164, § 151, 110 Stat. 1421, 1437 (1996). An identical amendment first appeared as
part of the American Overseas Interests Act of 1995. H.R. 1561, 104th Cong. § 3193 (1995).
H.R. 1561 was vetoed by President Clinton for reasons unrelated to the issue at hand. H. Doc.
No. 104-197 (April 15, 1996).
156. Cass R. Sunstein, Law andAdministration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071,
2109 (1990).
157. See Elise Keppler, Preventing Human Rights Abuses by Regulating Arms Brokering:
The US. Brokering Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 381,
391 (2001) (finding that the legislative history of the brokering amendment is limited to the
House Reports).
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are quite telling. The House Reports 58 for both the 1995 and 1996
amendments gave identical reasons for the brokering amendment:
[Currently], the AECA does not authorize the Department to regulate the
activities of U.S. persons (and foreign persons located in the U.S.)
brokering defense transactions overseas .... Nor does the AECA
authorize the Department to regulate the brokering of non-U.S. defense
articles or technology.
This provision provides those new authorities to ensure that arms export
support the furtherance of U.S. foreign policy objectives, national security
interests and world peace. More specifically, in some instances U.S.
persons are involved in arms deals that are inconsistent with U.S. policy.
Certain of these transactions could fuel regional instability, lend support to
terrorism or run counter to a U.S. policy decision not to sell arms to a
specific country or area. The extension of U.S. legal authority under this
provision to regulate brokering activities would help to curtail such
transactions.
59
The House Reports reveal that the brokering amendment's purpose was to close
three loopholes that the AECA previously left open. The first goal was to allow
the State Department to regulate the brokering activities of U.S. persons at
home and abroad.' 60 The State Department defines "U.S. person" as one who is
a "lawful permanent resident.. . or who is a protected individual."'161 The
House Report statement that "in some instances U.S. persons are involved in
arms deals inconsistent with U.S. policy' 62 further supports the argument that
the brokering amendment was principally concerned with regulating the
brokering activities of U.S. persons.
Second, Congress wanted to enable the State Department to regulate the
activities of"foreign persons located in the United States."' 63 A foreign person
is defined as a person who is not a "lawful permanent resident.., or who is not
a protected individual." '64 Third, Congress wanted to enable the State
Department to regulate the brokering of non-U.S. defense articles and
158. No Senate Report exists for the 1996 bill, and no Senate Report was found for the
1995 bill.
159. H.R.REP.No. 104-519, pt. 1, at 11-12 (1996);H.RREP.No. 104-128,pt. 1,at66-67
(1995).
160. See H.R. REP. No. 104-519, at 11-12 ("[Currently], the AECA does not authorize the
Department to regulate the activities of U.S. persons .....
161. 22 C.F.R. § 120.15 (2006).
162. H.R. REP.No. 104-519, at 12.
163. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
164. 22 C.F.R. § 120.16 (2006).
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technology. 165 Foreign persons located outside of United States territory are
conspicuously omitted from consideration. Most telling, however, is the first
sentence of the portion of the Report addressing the brokering amendment,
which explicitly limits the reach of the brokering requirement to U.S. persons
and foreign persons located within the United States. 166 The reason that
Congress omitted foreign persons abroad is unknown. Perhaps they are omitted
because "[v]irtually all exporters of defense articles employ [foreign] local
agents to assist in promoting and negotiating contracts with foreign
governments,"'167 and the added burden of licensing their foreign brokers would
have fatally crippled their ability to further important foreign policy goals
abroad. 1
68
2. The Foreign Policy Objectives ofArns Export Control Support
a Narrow Interpretation
Congress's ultimate goal regarding the international proliferation of arms
"continues to be a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers
and burdens of armaments." 169 Normative arguments about how best to meet
that goal and the appropriateness of arms exports as a tool for doing so are
compelling but beyond the scope of this Note. 70  The fact remains that
Congress continues to recognize the important (even if contradictory) role that
arms exports play in the furtherance of its larger objective:
The Congress recognizes, however, that the United States and other free
and independent countries continue to have valid requirements for effective
and mutually beneficial defense relationships in order to maintain and
foster the environment of international peace and security essential to
165. See H.R. REP. No. 104-519, pt. 1, at 12 (1996) ("Nor does the AECA authorize the
Department to regulate the brokering of non-U.S. defense articles or technology.").
166. See id. ("[Currently], the AECA does not authorize the Department to regulate the
activities of U.S. persons (and foreign persons located in the U.S.) brokering defense
transactions overseas .... ").
167. Client Alert, supra note 23, at 1.
168. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1144, at 12 (1976) (stating that "[tihe United States cannot
stand aside from [the international arms trade] process," implying that the United States should
remain competitive in the international arms trade business).
169. Foreign and National Security Objectives and Restraints, 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (2000).
170. For discussions regarding the policy arguments for and against the use of arms exports
as a foreign policy tool of the United States, see, e.g., Nolan, supra note 47, at 131-48
(critiquing recent administrations' use of arms exports as a foreign policy tool); ANTHONY,
supra note 30, at 183-204 (chronicling the process and historic policy objectives of the United
States' international trade of defense articles).
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social, economic, and political progress. Because of the growing cost and
complexity of defense equipment, it is increasingly difficult and
uneconomic for any country, particularly a developing country, to fill all of
its legitimate defense requirements from its own design and production
base. The need for international defense cooperation among the United
States and those friendly countries to which it is allied by mutual defense
treaties is especially important, since the effectiveness of their armed forces
to act in concert to deter or defeat aggression is directly related to the
operational compatibility of their defense equipment.
Accordingly, it remains the policy of the United States to facilitate the
common defense by entering into international arrangements with friendly
countries which further the objective of applying agreed resources of each
country to programs and projects of cooperative exchange of data, research,
development, production, procurement, and logistics support to achieve
specific national defense requirements and objectives of mutual concern.
171
If the State Department and DDTC take a position that unreasonably restricts
the ability of United States manufacturers to engage friendly nations in
otherwise sanctioned trade deals, then that position is contrary to Congress's
intent.' 72
DDTC's informal interpretation of § 129 has produced not only confusion
in the defense industry but also a backlog in the registration process.,
73
Because Congress presumes that nations in need of arms will "take the
necessary steps to get them,"'174 the increased processing time due to broader
licensing standards 171 could cause nations to go elsewhere for their arms. In
addition, foreign brokers (now required to register) would be less likely to agree
to register with DDTC knowing they would, in essence, be availing themselves
to the jurisdiction of the United States. If defense companies lost the ability to
171. 22 U.S.C. § 2751(2000); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1144, at 12(1976) (maintaining
that the United States should take an active role in the international trade of arms). The Report
states:
Every nation, large or small, is concerned with its ability to defend itself. If
weapons must be obtained from abroad, nations will take the necessary steps to get
them. The United States cannot stand aside from this process. It should be willing
to help, so long as its assistance is consistent with our security and foreign policy
interests.
Id.
172. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1144, at 12.
173. See U.S. Gov. Accountability Office, supra note 54, at 2-4 (acknowledging that the
processing time for applications has increased since 2003).
174. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1144, at 12.
175. See Hillen, supra note 52, at 4 (acknowledging "more aggressive compliance efforts"
in the DDTC's review of license applications).
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promote and negotiate contracts through these local mediators,'76 then the
United States' position in the global arms market would be disadvantaged-
contrary to Congress's foreign policy objectives.
Strains on the United States' defense industry are felt around the globe, for
the United States is the world's largest exporter of arms. 17 7 In fact, from 1999
to 2000, the United States exported more than six times the amount of defense
articles exported by the United Kingdom (the world's second leading
exporter). 78 The United States' role in the global trade of defense articles
cannot be overstated. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the United Kingdom, and
South Korea are among the leading purchasers of U.S. defense articles.
79
Whether a nation is the United States' oldest ally or a critical component to a
region's stability, Congress and the State Department have determined that it is
in the United States' interest to negotiate arms agreements with that nation.8 0
Many of the U.S. trade partners are key players in some of the most delicate
situations around the globe. If Congress deems it necessary to engage
(politically or militarily) in these delicate situations, then our regulatory
processes must operate with maximum efficiency and clarity. Therefore, the
confusion, unpredictability, and delay caused by DDTC's informal
interpretation of § 129 threaten the ability of the United States to maintain its
role in the preservation of regional and global balances of power.
B. Judicial Review Would Reject the Current Interpretation
Part IV.B. 1, above, discussed the doctrinal18' and statutory182 impediments
to meaningful judicial review of DDTC's interpretations of the AECA.
Judicial review, however, would be neither necessary nor missed if DDTC's
interpretation would meet with a court's approval. This section demonstrates
176. See Client Alert, supra note 23, at I ("Virtually all exporters of defense articles
employ such local agents .. ").
177. See U.S. Dep't of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1999-2000
at 39 (2002), available at http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/wmeat/WMEAT99-00/WMEAT99-
00.pdf (ranking countries by value of arms exported in 1999 (the most recent survey)).
178. Id.
179. Cong. Research Serv., U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major
Clients, 1997-2004, CRS 7 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govem/
109th/CRSRL33217.pdf.
180. See id. at CRS 1-7 (charting the dollar value of U.S. arms exports around the globe).
181. See supra Part IV.B. I (discussing the judicial deference to the Executive in matters of
foreign policy).
182. See supra Part IV.B.1 (explaining the APA (5 U.S.C. § 554) and ITAR (22 C.F.R.
§ 128.1) provisions which exclude the possibility of judicial review).
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that it would not. Because DDTC's regulation interprets a federal statute,
Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council'8 3 would govern its
review.14 A court properly applying Chevron would find the interpretation
unlawful.
1. Chevron, Step One: Has Congress Spoken to the Precise
Question at Issue?
The first question under the Chevron analysis is whether Congress's intent
in the statute is clear.' 85 If congressional intent is clear, "the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress."' 86 A court will use a variety of tools to ascertain congressional
intent. 87 Several of those tools (the statutory text of the statute, the legislative
183. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)
(holding that the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) interpretation of permit
requirements regarding pollution emitting devices was reasonable and entitled to deference). In
Chevron, the Supreme Court addressed whether the "EPA's decision to allow States to treat all
of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as though they were
encased within a single 'bubble' [was] based on a reasonable construction of the statutory term
'stationary source.'' Id. at 840. Various environmental groups filed petitions alleging that the
EPA's interpretation of the regulation allowing pollution causing devices to be consolidated
into one "bubble" was inconsistent with the overall goal of the Clean Air Act. Id. at 837.
The Court developed a two-step test to be used where, as here, a court reviews an agency
construction of a statute. Id. at 842. Step one asks whether Congress has directly spoken "to
the precise question at issue." Id. If so, then the court and the agency must acquiesce to
Congress's expressed intention. Id. at 842-43. If Congress has not directly addressed the issue,
then the courts move to step two which asks "whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843. The Court noted that an agency's
interpretation is given "considerable weight" because Congress delegated the authority "to
elucidate a specific provision." Id. at 844.
The Court found that Congress had not expressed a specific intention regarding the
meaning of the specific statutory provision. Id. at 845. Therefore, the EPA's interpretation was
entitled to "controlling weight" unless it was "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute." Id. at 844. The Court concluded that the EPA's interpretation was "a reasonable
accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference." Id. at 865.
184. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (providing a brief discussion of the
Chevron doctrine and its role in maintaining the checks and balances between the three
branches).
185. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
186. Id. at 842-43.
187. See MICHAEL F. DUFFY, A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEw OF FEDERAL
AGENCIES 57 (2005) ("The court should use the 'traditional tools of statutory construction' to
determine whether the meaning of the statute is clear .... "). These tools include: (1) the text of
the statute, (2) dictionary definitions, (3) canons of construction, (4) statutory structure,
(5) legislative purpose, and (6) legislative history. Id.
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history and the legislative purpose) 188 were analyzed in the preceding section.
That analysis strongly suggested that the intent of the brokering amendment is
clear-foreign persons located outside the jurisdiction of the United States are
beyond the reach of the statute."'
This conclusion is strengthened by the doctrine that a reviewing court
presumes that "Congress legislates against the backdrop of the presumption
against extraterritoriality."'' 90  Courts require "affirmative evidence" of
Congress's intent before they will apply a statute extraterritorially.191 Unless
there is "'clearly expressed '" 92 evidence that Congress intended the statute to
apply extraterritorially, then a reviewing court will assume that the statute
applies only domestically. 1
93
DDTC's current interpretation of"otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States" evidences a belief that the AECA can apply extraterritorially
to foreign persons in foreign nations who are not subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States. 94 This interpretation, in order to be valid, must be based
upon a "clearly expressed" indication from Congress that the brokering
provision is to apply extraterritorially. 95 The AECA does not provide the type
of explicit reference to extraterritoriality that the Supreme Court requires.
One could argue that the language "every person" 19 expresses Congress's
desire that the statute apply extraterritorially. This reference, however, falls
short of the "clearly expressed" intent required, especially considering the
188. Id.
189. See supra Part V.A (concluding that the Congress intended a narrower reading of
"otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" consistent with the previous
interpretation discussed in Part III.A).
190. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,249
(1991) (concluding that the petitioner did not overcome the presumption against extraterritorial
jurisdiction); see also United States v. Yakou, 393 F.3d 231, 242-43 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing
Arabian American Oil Co. and the assumption against extraterritoriality as it applies to the
AECA).
191. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 176 (1993); see also Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. at 249 (requiring explicit congressional intent to apply a statute extraterritorially).
192. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo,
S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)).
193. Id.
194. See supra Part III.B (discussing the jurisdictional implications of DDTC's current
interpretation).
195. See Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248 ("[W]e look to see whether 'language in the
[relevant Act] gives any indication of a congressional purpose to extend its coverage beyond
places over which the United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative
control.'" (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949))).
196. 22 U.S.C § 2778(b)(1)(A)(ii)(1) (2000).
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legislative history that limits the reach of the amendment to U.S. persons and
foreign persons in the territorial United States.197 Another counterargument is
that Part IV of the statute implies a borderless application of the AECA with
the language "non-United States defense articles... regardless of whether such
article or service is of United States origin. ' 198 This provision, however, simply
defines what constitutes a "foreign defense article" and has no bearing on the
class of persons (domestic, foreign, or both) to whom the statute applies.1 99
Given that the only indication of the jurisdictional reach of the brokering
amendment in the statute and its legislative history expresses Congress's intent
to exclude foreign persons in foreign nations, 2°° a reviewing court would likely
sustain Congress's presumption against extraterritoriality. Therefore, DDTC's
extraterritorial application of the brokering amendment is contrary to
Congress's expressed intent against extraterritoriality.
Step two of Chevron assumes that if Congress has not addressed the issue
directly, then it has delegated the power to "elucidate a specific provision of the
statute.,201 A court will defer to an agency's interpretation if it is not "arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."20 2 This Note argues that
DDTC's interpretation would fail step one, thereby eliminating any analysis
under step two. For the sake of being comprehensive, however, this Note
concludes that the result under a step two analysis is unclear. On the one hand,
DDTC's interpretation may be "manifestly contrary to the statute" and invalid
under step two because it conflicts with Congress's implicit policy of
encouraging a competitive defense industry.20 3 On the other hand, in step two,
a court will give an agency's construction "considerable weight. 2 04 That
deference coupled with the general "discretion and freedom from statutory
restriction 00 5 given to the Executive in international matters2°6 seems to
suggest that DDTC's interpretation would survive step two of Chevron.
197. See supra Part V.A. 1 (discussing the legislative history of the brokering amendment).
198. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(1)(a)(ii)(IV) (2000).
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 158-168 and accompanying text (describing Congress's intention to
limit the scope of the brokering amendment).
201. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1986).
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 169-172 and accompanying text (examining congressional objectives
explicit and implicit in the AECA).
204. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
205. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
206. See id. (identifying the Executive as the "sole organ" of the United States in foreign
affairs).
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2. United States v. Yakou Reinforces a Narrow Interpretation of the
Brokering Amendment
A hypothetical analysis using the traditional tenets of judicial review of
administrative action is worthwhile because it exposes many of the
inconsistencies between Congress's intent and DDTC's interpretation of the
brokering amendment.2 °7 Even more convincing, however, is an actual judicial
review of the brokering amendment's scope. In May 2005,208 the D.C. Circuit
decided United States v. Yakou, 209 which offered an examination of the
brokering amendment consistent with the analysis above. Yakou adds further
support to the argument that DDTC's current interpretation fails step one of the
Chevron analysis because it is contrary to the expressed intent of Congress.21 °
In Yakou, the D.C. Circuit considered whether the defendant, Sabri
Yakou, violated the AECA and the ITAR's requirement that anyone engaged in
brokering activities register with DDTC.21 The defendant was an Iraqi citizen
who lived in the United States from 1986 until 1993, when he moved back to
Iraq. 21 2 Despite severing all ties to the United States, the defendant never
formally renounced his status as a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR).213 In
2003, federal agents arrested the defendant's son and notified the defendant
that he should come to the United States to assist his son.214 When Mr. Yakou
arrived in the United States he was arrested for brokering arms sales without a
license from DDTC.215
The court looked to the language of § 129.3 as well as the legislative
history of the brokering amendment and reasoned that "Congress had expressed
its intent to limit the extraterritorial reach of the Brokering Amendment and
thus the ITAR to 'U.S. persons.' 21 6 The Court went on to find that Congress
207. See supra Part V.B. 1 (using the analysis from Chevron step one to examine DDTC's
current interpretation of § 129).
208. The case was decided on January 4, 2005, but an amended opinion was submitted
May 9, 2005.
209. United States v. Yakou, 393 F.3d 231, 244 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the
defendant was not in violation of the brokering registration requirement because ITAR limits
extraterritorial jurisdiction to "U.S. persons").
210. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,842 (1984) ("If
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter. .. .
211. Yakou, 393 F.3d at 233.




216. Yakou, 393 F.3d at 243.
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was not concerned "with foreign brokers located outside the United States. '" 217
The court did not consider Mr. Yakou's LPR status sufficient to qualify him as
a "U.S. person" under the ITAR and ruled that he was outside the scope of the
statute.218
The D.C. Circuit's examination of the brokering amendment carries great
weight because black letter administrative law states that "'the courts are the
final authorities on issues of statutory construction.' 219 The court's analysis of
the brokering amendment and its scope confirms, in three ways, that DDTC's
current expansive interpretation is contrary to congressional intent and would
likely not pass Chevron review if review were available. 220 First, the court
reinforces the argument that the "every person" language in the AECA should
not be read literally but more narrowly to include only U.S. persons and foreign
persons located within the United States (and persons "otherwise subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States").221 The court found that, "[i]n so construing
the Brokering Amendment's reference to 'every person,' the ITAR reflects the
legislative history revealing that in enacting the Brokering Amendment
Congress was focusing on 'U.S. persons' and 'foreign persons located in the
[United States].'
222
Second, the court found that Congress had not "clearly expressed" its
intention that the brokering amendment be applied extraterritorially. This
supports the proposition223 that there is nothing in the AECA or its legislative
history to suggest that the brokering requirement is to apply to foreign persons
in foreign nations.224 Third, the court's analysis of the legislative history
reveals, similar to the analysis in the preceding section, that Congress
conspicuously omitted foreign persons in foreign nations from the brokering
217. Id.
218. Id. at 244.
219. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1973) (quoting
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Fed. Mar. Comn'n, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968)).
220. See id. (finding that the courts have the final say on matters of statutory construction,
implying that any interpretation contrary to a judicial determination of congressional intent
would be overruled).
221. United States v. Yakou, 393 F.3d 231, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
222. Id.
223. See supra notes 190-200 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial presumption
that Congress legislates against extraterritoriality).
224. See Yakou, 393 F.3d at 243 ("Congress has not expressed with the requisite clarity
that it sought to apply the Brokering Amendment outside the United States [jurisdiction] ....
[T]he Brokering Amendment and the ITAR have extraterritorial effect for 'U.S. persons,' they
do not have such effect for 'foreign persons'... whose conduct occurs outside the United
States.") (emphasis added).
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amendment's reach.225 Citing the House Reports,226 the court states: "In the
Brokering Amendment, then, Congress was concerned with both United States
brokers of arms and foreign brokers of arms located in the United States, but
not with foreign brokers located outside the United States." 
227
The aftermath of Yakou and DDTC's position on the opinion warrant a
few additional comments. Not surprisingly, DDTC indicated initially that it
would not follow the Yakou interpretation as it stood when the decision was
handed down on January 9, 2005, and would continue to adhere to its own
interpretation of § 129.228 Furthermore, in response to an appeal by the U.S.
Government, the D.C. Circuit amended its opinion to clarify its findings
concerning the scope of the brokering amendment.229
Among the several changes, a significant amendment to the opinion noted
that the government did not argue that Mr. Yakou was "otherwise subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States. 2 30 Because the court did not rule on this
issue, the amended opinion effectively reopened the question of whether Mr.
Yakou, and similarly situated foreign persons, would be "otherwise subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States.",231 Thus, the holding in Yakou does not
go so far as to foreclose any alternative interpretation of the brokering
amendment. In fact, one could argue that the opinion, as amended, has no
bearing on the meaning of "otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.
232
However, the court's narrow interpretation of "every person," its
adherence to the presumption against extraterritoriality, and its reading of the
legislative history33 should not be ignored.234 Therefore, despite the amended
225. See id. (citing the legislative history).
226. H.R. REP. No. 104-519, pt. 1, at 11-12 (1996); see supra note 159 and accompanying
text (examining the House Report and its meaning).
227. United States v. Yakou, 393 F.3d 231, 243 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
228. See Client Alert, supra note 23, at 2 (explaining DDTC's position on the Yakou
decision).
229. See United States v. Yakou, 428 F.3d 241, 241 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (order granting in
part and denying in part the government's motion to clarify the opinion); see also Client Alert,
supra note 23, at 2 (noting the purpose of the D.C. Circuit's amendments).
230. Yakou, 428 F.3d at 253.
231. Id. (noting that the government did not argue that Mr. Yakou was "otherwise subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States," and therefore implying that the court did not address
that issue).
232. See Client Alert, supra note 23, at 2 ("[A]s amended, the Yakou decision no longer
has any bearing on interpretation of the scope of the phrase 'otherwise subject to' ....").
233. See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text (explaining the three ways in which
Yakou supports a narrow interpretation of the brokering amendment).
234. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (noting that judicial interpretations of
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opinion and DDTC's predictable opposition to the case, Yakou significantly
reinforces the argument reiterated throughout this subpart-that DDTC's
current interpretation is contrary to Congress's clear intention of a narrow
interpretation of the brokering amendment and would fail step one of Chevron
if judicial review were possible.
VI. Toward a Solution: A Legislative Tool Can Adequately Address
the Political Imbalance
DDTC's current interpretation of § 129 expands its earlier interpretation
and hinders the defense industry's ability to compete in the worldwide arms
trade.235 Such a controversy should have an adequate remedy in our system,
which was established upon a foundation of checks and balances.236 There is,
however, no adequate check because judicial review is precluded 237 and
congressional mechanisms are either inadequate or ineffective.23 ' The
frustrating imbalance is exacerbated by the conclusion reached in Part V-that
the Legislative branch and the Judicial branch both have incentives to use any
potential check on the Executive because DDTC's interpretation is contrary to
Congress's clear intention.239 This Note's primary goal is to demonstrate that
the absence of effective checks on executive action in arms export regulation is
a serious problem. This Part complements that project by sketching the
contours of a possible solution.
A. The Status Quo Is Not an Option
Is there an adequate solution to this problem? Several possibilities present
themselves. The easiest option is to tolerate the status quo and hope for the
statutory language are authoritative).
235. See supra Part III (noting DDTC's previous and current interpretations of § 129 and
the consequences of the current interpretation).
236. See supra Part IV.A (describing our system of checks and balances and the current
state of this system in light of the rise of the administrative state).
237. See supra Part IV.B.1 (exploring the doctrinal and statutory barriers to judicial
review).
238. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the troubles associated with relying on
congressional remedies to solve the problem).
239. See supra Part V.A (examining the legislative history and legislative purposes of the
AECA and the brokering amendment in order to discern the congressional intent); Part V.B. 1
(concluding that DDTC's interpretation would fail step one of Chevron because Congress has
already spoken to the issue at hand).
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best: That the State Department will alter its perspective independently, or a
future administration will restore the correct interpretation, or the persuasive
powers of non-governmental organizations will move Congress to address the
situation by way of legislation. The easiest solution is not always the correct
one. The discussion in Parts III, IV, and V highlighted the reasons why
tolerating the status quo, while an option, is not a solution.240 The first two
options-waiting for independent action by the State Department or waiting
until the next election-may eventually lead to the correct interpretation of
§ 129, but neither option effectively addresses the underlying structural
problem. Even if the State Department independently were to realign its
interpretation with Congress's original intent, there is still no institutional check
that prevents it from unilaterally adopting another view. The problem is not the
misinterpretation of § 129 standing alone. The problem is the imbalance of
power that allows the State Department to take that view with impunity, and
neither of the wait-and-see options provides a solution to the imbalance.
The third option-to rely on the persuasive powers of non-governmental
organizations-warrants some discussion because it addresses the industry's
lobbying power. That factor is not discussed in this Note but is an important
part of the story.241 Defense trade policy might not inspire the same emotion
across America that traditional trade policy does, 242 but it is certainly a high
stakes game.243 Much scholarship has been devoted to the campaign
240. See supra Part V (explaining why DDTC's current interpretation is incorrect and
inconsistent with congressional intent); Part V.A.2 (discussing the negative ramifications of
DDTC's current interpretation).
241. Interestingly, one study of the legislative history of the brokering amendment argues
that the reason there is so little in the congressional record concerning the 1996 amendment is
that Senate staff and other drafters intentionally kept the amendment below the radar to avoid
political opposition from the defense industry. See Keppler, supra note 157, at 392 ("Notably,
the non-governmental community was not involved. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
in the United States had not commenced legislative advocacy on obtaining increased regulation
of brokers at that time, suggesting that advocacy related to the problems posed by unregulated
brokering had not yet emerged.").
242. See Young, supra note 109, at 22 ("Trade policy, in particular, often hits a very
personal note for Americans, and lately has been closely associated with both the loss and
creation ofjobs for blue collar workers, as well as profit margins for business in general."); see,
e.g., Paul Blustein & Mike Allen, Trade Pact Approved By House; GOP Struggles to Eke Out
217-215 Victory on CAFTA, WASH. POST, July, 28, 2005, at A01 (discussing the intense
struggle on Capitol Hill and across America involved in the passage of free trade agreements).
243. See, e.g., Commercialization of Space: Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act
of 2004, 17 HAjtv. J.L. & TECH. 619, 623 (noting that two of the largest defense contractors
"devote more than $19 million annually to lobbying").
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contributions and lobbying expenditures of major defense contractors and the
political clout that results from those efforts. 2"
With such a strong voice in the legislative process, 245 perhaps defense
contractors could effectively lobby congressional leadership to overrule
DDTC's interpretation of § 129. This would certainly be an effective solution
to the particular problem, but this Note addresses a broader structural
imbalance among the three branches that is not limited to DDTC's current
reading of the § 129.246 For example, what if DDTC, instead of its current
broad interpretation imposed an extremely narrow interpretation of § 129 under
which foreign persons within the United States were not required to register?
This interpretation would lead to the same imbalance of power because there
would still be no adequate congressional remedy and no judicial review. The
defense industry, however, is unlikely to oppose such an interpretation because
it eliminates the harm associated with DDTC's broader view.247 There may be
political opposition to a narrower interpretation of § 129, but it would lack the
financial and political clout that the defense industry offers. Without the
resources to gamer the widespread support necessary to generate legislative
change, 2" opposition to a narrower interpretation of § 129 is unlikely to
effectuate change.
Relying on the public or on private interest groups does not adequately
address the problem because of the shortcomings highlighted in the preceding
example. This Note uses the interpretation of § 129 to argue that a structural
problem exists among the three branches, but the problem is by no means
limited to § 129. Therefore, relying on the persuasive ability of the defense
industry does not address the broader implications of the problem-namely
244. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts
Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REv. 989, 1022-23
(2005) (discussing the effects and influence of the increasingly powerful private military
contractors on foreign policy objectives); Sheryl Fred, The Best Defense: A Guide to the
Interests Driving the FY2004 Defense Budget, OPENSECRETS.ORG, Oct. 1, 2003,
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/defensebudget/indexl.asp (last visited Nov. 27, 2006)
(describing the effectiveness of the defense contractors' campaign contributions and lobbying
efforts in securing millions of dollars worth of contracts in the FY 2004 federal budget) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
245. See Fred, supra note 244 (noting the influence of campaign and lobbying expenditures
on the appropriations process).
246. See supra Part IV (explaining generally the failure of checks and balances regarding
executive agencies' interpretations of statutes involving elements of national security).
247. See supra Parts I & V.A.2 (discussing the administrative and competitive harm
suffered by the defense manufacturing industry as a result of DDTC's current interpretation).
248. See supra notes 138-39 (observing the broad-based support needed to effectuate
legislative change).
INADEQUATE CHECKS AND BALANCES
unchecked executive power. This Note advocates a structural solution to a
structural problem.
B. A Congressional Solution Is Preferable to a Judicial Remedy
There are legislative and judicial approaches that may compensate for the
current imbalance of power. This Note advocates a legislative solution because
"[f]oreign relations are political relations conducted by the political branches of
the federal government.0 49  The judiciary is ill-equipped 250 and often
unwilling25' to settle separation of powers conflicts between the President and
Congress, especially in the realm of foreign affairs. 52 The power to conduct
the international trade of defense articles is vested both in Congress's authority
to regulate trade with foreign nations2 53 and the President's power to design and
execute foreign policy.25 4 Justice Jackson once wrote that "only Congress itself
249. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CoNSTTUTION 131 (2d ed. 1996).
250. See id. at 141 ("Thanks to both constitutional, legislative, and political limitations on
the business of the courts, the paramount judicial prerogative of invalidating acts of the political
branches has not loomed large in the conduct of foreign relations.").
251. See id. at 316 (commenting that courts are hesitant to settle separation of powers
disputes in matters of foreign policy). Renowned scholar of constitutional and international
law, Louis Henkin, notes:
The courts... are not likely to step into intense confrontations between President
and Congress, or to inhibit either branch when the other does not object. Whether
from a sense that the boundary between Congress and President... cannot be
defined by law, whether from realization of the inherent limitations of judicial
power or from prudence, whether under a doctrine of 'political questions' or by
other judicial devices and formulae for abstention, courts will not rush to make
certain what was left uncertain, to curtail the power of the political branches, to
arbitrate their differences.
Id.
252. See id. at 134 ("In principle, judicial review applies to foreign affairs as elsewhere, but
practice reflects differences."); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,318
(1936) (citing the absolute powers vested in the federal government, which are "'necessary to
maintain an effective control of international relations"' (quoting Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S.
378, 396 (1933))); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) ("The conduct of the
foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and
Legislative-'the political'-Departments of the Government, and the propriety of what may be
done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."); see
also 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(4) (2004) (excluding "foreign affairs functions" from administrative
adjudications).
253. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
254. See Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 319 ("'The President is the sole organ
of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."' (quoting
John Marshall)).
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can prevent power from slipping through its fingers. ''255 Consequently, in order
adequately to address the imbalance of power that began with a delegation of
256legislative power, Congress must step forward and assert its role not only as




but also as the only constitutional counterpoint to the Executive's use or abuse
of delegated authority in foreign relations.258
C. A Limited Legislative Veto Is an Effective and Doctrinally
Defensible Solution
A thoughtfully designed legislative veto is the most effective and
constitutionally tolerable legislative tool to combat the unchecked power of the
Executive in the area of arms trade.259 INS v. Chadha260 presents a general
255. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
256. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (2000) ("[T]he President is authorized to control the
import and the export of defense articles .....
257. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
258. See HENKIN, supra note 249, at 321 (describing the beneficial effects that result from
the coordination between "Presidential expertise and some inexpert Congressional wisdom").
259. See McCutchen, supra note 84, at 3 (1994) ("Allowing the legislature to veto a
regulation enacted by an agency pursuant to such an open-ended drlegation serves
constitutional objectives by imposing a check on agency power.").
260. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,959 (1983) (holding the congressional veto used in
the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act) unconstitutional). In Chadha, the Supreme Court
considered a provision in the Act which allowed one house of Congress to invalidate decisions
made by the Attorney General regarding deportable aliens in the United States. Id. at 923.
Chadha was in the United States on an expired student visa in 1974 when an Immigration Judge
within the INS suspended his scheduled deportation. Id. at 923-24. Pursuant to the Act, INS
submitted a detailed report of the proceedings to Congress. Id. at 924. Congress, using its veto
power, reversed the Attorney General's suspension order, thus prompting the INS to initiate
deportation proceedings against Chadha. Id. at 928. Chadha challenged the congressional order
as a violation of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Id. The Supreme Court
agreed, reasoning that the congressional veto was inconsistent with the constitutional design of
the Framers. Id. at 945-46.
First, Article I requires that Congress present all legislation to the President for approval.
Id. The congressional veto in the Act is legislative in nature, but does not provide for executive
approval, and therefore violates the Presentment Clause. Id The provision also required that
only one house of Congress was necessary to veto a deportation decision by the Attorney
General. Id. at 952. This, the Court said, was contrary to the requirement that all legislation
pass both houses before becoming law. Id. at 951. Finally, the Court noted that "not every
action taken by either House is subject to the bicameralism and presentment requirements." Id.
at 952. The Constitution, however, "precisely defined" the situations in which one House may
act alone, and the provision in the Act does not fall under one of those exceptions. Id. at 955-
56. The Court noted that the congressional veto was unnecessary as a check on executive power
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objection to the use of the legislative veto, 261 but as subpart C.2 will argue,
these circumstances are distinguishable from the situation in Chadha. The
legislative veto effectively compensates for the delegation of law-making
powers from Congress to the President because it "secures the accountability of
executive and independent agencies. 2 62 Agency decisions that are exposed to
congressional scrutiny can only help to "improve the quality of that action."
263
The legislative veto is especially applicable in this situation because DDTC's
interpretation is not open to judicial review, 264 and the interpretation directly
interferes with Congress's power to "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations.
2 65
1. The Legislative Tool Is Appropriate Because It Gives Congress a Seat
at the Table
Following the Chadha decision, Congress was forced to reevaluate the
dozens of statutes that contained veto provisions,
266 including the AECA. 267
because the "administrative activity cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created
it .... [I]f that authority is exceeded it is open to judicial review as well as the power of
Congress to modify or revoke the authority entirely." Id. at 953-54 n. 16.
261. See id. at 959 (holding the use of the congressional veto unconstitutional).
262. Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
263. McCutchen, supra note 84, at 38 (quoting Alexander Hamilton's statement in
Federalist Paper number 73, "The oftener the measure is brought under examination, the greater
the diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those
errors which flow from want of due deliberation").
264. See supra Part IV.B. I (explaining the impossibility ofjudicial review due to the APA
and general judicial deference to the Executive in foreign affairs).
265. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
266. But see Louis FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE
EXECUTIVE 102 (4th ed. 1998) ("Chadha has not stopped Congress from placing legislative
vetoes in public laws. These bills are regularly signed into law .... From the day that Chadha
was issued, on June 23, 1983, to the end of 1997, more than four hundred new legislative vetoes
have been enacted into law.").
267. See Legislative Veto: Arms Export Control Act: Hearing Before the Committee on
Foreign Relations United States Senate Ninety-Eighth Congress First Session on S. 1050, 98th
Cong. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Legislative Veto Hearing] (statement of Sen. Mathias, Member,
Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations) (considering the "legal impact of the decision of the
Supreme Court in declaring that the so-called legislative veto is an unconstitutional procedure").
For an overview of the veto provisions that were in the AECA, see id. at 50-52.
Congress's most powerful veto power in the AECA was its ability to issue a concurrent
resolution of disapproval (basically a two-house veto). FISHER, supra note 266, at 213-14.
Congress never exercised this power, "but the threat of disapproval forced the president a
number of times to make compromises that restricted the use of weapons." Id. at 213.
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One of the recurring concerns in the reevaluation process was creating an
imbalance of power between the President and Congress. Sen. Robert C. Byrd
articulated the concern:
If our "veto" power has been removed, and if that "veto" power is
"separable" from the rest of the statute, then that would mean that the
Executive has now total, unrestricted authority .... And Congress would
be without any role whatsoever.
On the other hand, an argument could be made that our invalid "veto"
powers cannot be "separated" from the rest of the Arms Export Control
law. If that were so, then that would mean that the entire statute is invalid.
And that, in turn, would mean that the President is now without any
authority to engage in any arms transfers.
It seems to me that either of these results is intolerable.268
Twenty-three years later, Sen. Byrd's concern has become a reality, at least
with respect to the Executive's interpretation of § 129. Congress currently has
no role or recourse 269 against DDTC's current interpretation of § 129.
The proposition articulated above, that Congress is required to have a seat
at the table in matters of arms exports, has been reiterated numerous times.27°
One notable expression is the AECA itself, for its chief concern was "to
establish procedures which will help insure congressional oversight of arms
transfers. '271 Another is found in the text of Article I of the Constitution which
provides that Congress has the power to regulate "Commerce with foreign
Nations. 2 72 The troubling realization that Congress has no seat at the table is
further evidence of the need for a compensating tool which restores or at least
tips the scales back to a balanced relationship between Congress and the
Executive in arms exports.
268. Legislative Veto Hearing, supra note 267, at 11 (statement of Sen. Byrd, Member,
Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 1 (statement of Sen.
Mathias, Member, Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations) (focusing the hearing on the justification
for congressional involvement in arms export decisions).
269. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the ineffective and inadequate congressional
checks).
270. See also Legislative Veto Hearing. supra note 267, at I I (statement of Sen. Byrd,
Member, Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations) (stating that Article I, section 8, clause 3 clearly
provides a role for Congress in arms sales decisions).
271. H.R. REP. No. 94-1144, at 13 (1976) ("Too often in the past decisions have been made
with respect to security assistance without the knowledge or concurrence of the Congress.").
272. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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The problem is particularly important today because it is one issue in an
increasing number of issues where the Executive is accused of overstepping its
power in matters of foreign policy. For example, newspaper headlines from
across the nation have drawn attention to the President's use of warrantless
wiretapping and the Executive's contention that detainees be removed from the
273 thSjurisdiction of the federal courts. Like the State Department's perceived
scope of the brokering amendment, "the key legal struggles over domestic
spying [and other issues] go not to its wisdom, but to the thorny issue of
whether the [P]resident has exceeded his constitutional powers in disregarding"
statutory limits 274 The AECA, like the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act,275 confers upon the Executive wide discretion to implement the statute, but
the Executive "cannot choose to flout or ignore, 2 76 Congress's mandate in
doing so.
In the case of the President's use of warrantless wiretapping, the Senate
has quickly "reassert[ed] congressional responsibility and oversight. ' 277 The
creative solution calls for the formation of a "terrorist surveillance
subcommittee" that will have access to the details of the Executive's
surveillance program. 278 The agreement requires the Attorney General to seek a
warrant whenever possible, and to report to the subcommittee every forty-five
days on cases where the administration has not sought a warrant. 279 The plan
has its critics 28° and it may or may not go far enough to curtail the President's
use of warrantless wiretapping, but the prudence of the plan is irrelevant to this
Note. The plan is important to this Note because it is recent evidence of the
ability of Congress to structurally respond to an imbalance of power. This
subpart argues that Congress must reassert itself in matters of arms export
273. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 16, at KI (reflecting on the increasing concerns in
Congress and across the country that the President is "pushing the envelope of presidential
power").
274. Epstein, supra note 16, at A16; see also Will, supra note 16, at A27 ("Arguably
[President Bush] should have begun surveillance of domestic-to-domestic calls-the kind the
Sept. 11 terrorists made. But 53 months later, Congress should make all necessary actions
lawful by authorizing the [P]resident to take those actions.").
275. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2004) (granting the President the power to authorize
surveillance without a court order).
276. Epstein, supra note 16, at A16.
277. David D. Kirkpatrick & Scott Shane, G.O.P. Senators Say Accord Is Set on
Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at Al (late ed.) (quoting Sen. Olympia Snowe).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See, e.g., id. (quoting Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV, "[t]he committee is, to put it
bluntly, basically under the control of the White House").
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regulation, just as it has done with the Executive's use of foreign intelligence.
The remainder of this Note sketches out why the legislative veto is an
appropriate vessel for Congress to reassert itself.
2. Chadha Did Not Contemplate a Situation in Which Executive Authority
Is Left Unchecked
In Chadha, Chief Justice Burger held that the legislative veto in the
Immigration and Nationality Act was unconstitutional because it did not adhere
to the "presentment" and "bicameralism" requirements of Article I
legislation.28' Congress argued, in opposition, that the legislative veto was a
necessary check on the Executive's use of congressionally delegated
authority. 2  Essentially, Congress believed that without such a legislative
check the Executive could engage in lawmaking in violation of Article I, which
grants all legislative powers to Congress.283 The majority rebutted that
assertion by finding that the Executive's authority is limited by the text of the
statute, and there are mechanisms available to ensure that the limits of the
language are not breached.2 4
The bicameral process is not necessary as a check on the Executive's
administration of the laws because his administrative activity cannot reach
beyond the limits of the statute that created it-a statute duly enacted
pursuant to Art. I, § § 1, 7. The constitutionality of the Attorney General's
execution of the authority delegated to him by [the statute] involves only a
question of delegation doctrine. The courts, when a case or controversy
arises, can always "ascertain whether the will ofCongress has been obeyed"
and can enforce adherence to statutory standards.28
The reliance on the availability ofjudicial review as a check on the Executive's
use of delegated authority is explicit in the Court's analysis.28 6 Also explicit in
the Court's reasoning is its reliance on Congress's ability to check the
281. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955-59 (1983).
282. See id. at 953 n.16 (summarizing Congress's arguments in favor of the legislative
veto).
283. See id. ("Congress protests that affirming the Court of Appeals in these cases will
sanction lawmaking by the Attorney General... .
284. Id.
285. Id. (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944)).
286. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n. 16 ("The courts, when a case or controversy arises, can
always ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed, and can enforce adherence to
statutory standards.").
INADEQUATE CHECKS AND BALANCES
Executive. Not only do the courts act as a check, but the majority found that
Congress may step in as well to "modify or revoke the authority entirely.
2 87
This Note does not argue that Chadha was wrongly decided.288 It simply
suggests that the majority in Chadha did not contemplate a situation like the
one explored in this Note. The Chadha majority presumes that judicial and
legislative checks are always available to compensate for the delegation of
legislative authority to the Executive.2 89 But what if they are not available?
2 90
Part IV concluded that those presumptive checks do not apply to the State
Department's interpretation of the AECA. Judicial review is not available.29'
A congressional response is also ineffective. 292 Admittedly, Congress may
legislate using Article I processes, but that process is long, arduous, and
unpredictable. 93 Moreover, pursuant to Article I, § 7, cl. 2, such a legislative
reaction must get past the President's desk, whether with his signature or a two-
thirds congressional majority. Assuming the President would veto a legislative
reaction,294 the only conceivable check on DDTC's current interpretation, under
the Chadha majority's analysis, is a super-majority29' vote in Congress.
Without the presumptive checks that the Court relies on in Chadha, this Note
contends that there is room for the reintroduction of a thoughtfully designed,
narrowly applied legislative veto.
287. Id.at953n.16.
288. See infra Part VI.C.3 (agreeing that Chadha is applied appropriately to situations
where political checks are effective but not in situations that mirror the political imbalance in
the regulation of arms exports).
289. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953-54 n.16 ("That kind of Executive action is always
subject to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it; and if that authority is
exceeded it is open to judicial review as well as the power of Congress to modify or revoke the
authority entirely.").
290. See FISHER, supra note 266, at 99 ("Even with Chadha, the need for a quid pro quo
between Congress and the Executive branch remains.").
291. See supra Part I.B. 1 (explaining the doctrinal and statutory preclusions to judicial
review).
292. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the ineffectiveness of traditional congressional
controls as a check on executive authority).
293. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text (discussing the cumbersome Article I
process and the unlikelihood that many agency interpretations will inspire the widespread
opposition necessary to pass a bill and overcome the President's veto).
294. See Nick Smith, Restoration of Congressional Authority and Responsibility Over the
Regulatory Process, 33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 323,326 (1996) ("Since the President's appointees
have endorsed the regulation, presumably the President does as well. Therefore, to enact a
legislative override would almost certainly require two-thirds majorities in both houses.").
295. A super-majority is a two-thirds majority in both Houses.
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3. The Legislative Veto 's Viability Is Enhanced Because It Applies Only to
This Narrow Situation
The argument that the legislative veto should be resuscitated twenty-three
years after its death is not made lightly. Subsection 1 argued that Congress's
role in arms exports must be structurally strengthened. Subsection 2 argued
that the Chadha majority did not contemplate a situation in which an
administrative agency's discretion is left unchecked, thereby opening up room
for a discussion of the legislative veto in such situations. This subsection's
purpose is to describe the narrow situation in which this legislative veto296 will
apply and to refute the slippery slope counterargument that allowing one
legislative veto will open the door to the institution's widespread use.
The argument begins by asserting that Chadha is good law and any
legislative veto is presumptively invalid.297 However, a more urgent problem
surfaces in a situation that "raises the very danger the Framers sought to
avoid-the exercise of unchecked power., 298 When such a situation arises and
institutional checks are ineffective, "common sense and the inherent necessities
of the governmental co-ordination"2 99 should require that formalistic rules 3° °
yield in situations that strike at the heart of the American constitutional system,
such as instances of unchecked power. Chief Justice John Marshall recognized
the need for a practical and innovative approach to government when he said,
"It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for
exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can
be best provided for as they occur. 30 1 Such exigent circumstances exist today
where the executive power to regulate arms transfers is effectively unchecked,
and "[t]he Constitution... authorizes Congress and the President to try novel
methods 30 2 to rebalance the powers. If the rebalancing involves
constitutionally suspect mechanisms, such as the veto provisions this Note
296. The general structure of the veto itself will be described infra Part VI.C.4.
297. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding the congressional veto
provision unconstitutional).
298. Id. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring).
299. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
300. The formalistic prohibition against legislative vetoes is an example of such a rule. See
McCutchen, supra note 84, at 38 (conceding that, under a formal reading of Article I, legislative
vetoes are unconstitutional, but should be viewed as a practical "compensating institution" for
the delegation of legislative power (also literally unconstitutional)).
301. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 316 (1819).
302. Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417,497 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with the majority's rejection of Congress's Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C. § 691 (2004)).
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suggests, then it should be implemented as narrowly as possible and along
definite lines.3 °3
Part II discussed the unique niche that the international trade of defense
articles occupies in the separation of powers. On one hand, arms transfers are
an integral piece of the President's foreign policy and fall under the Executive's
power as the "sole organ" of the United States in foreign affairs. 3° On the
other hand, arms sales are also clearly "Commerce with foreign Nations" and
fall under Congress's Article I, Section 8 commerce power. The international
trade of defense articles is also unique because it represents the only one of
Congress's enumerated foreign affairs powers to which the legislative veto can
and should apply.
The Constitution bestows upon Congress four powers directly related to
foreign affairs. 30 5  These powers are: "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations;, 30 6 "define and punish Piracies and Felonies on the high Seas, and
Offenses against the Law of Nations; 30 7 "declare War; 30 8 and "establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization. '" 309 The power that is implicated in this Note-
the power to regulate foreign commerce-is distinguishable from the other
enumerated foreign affairs powers. A legislative veto to protect those other
powers is unnecessary and therefore unconstitutional under Chadha.
The power "to define and punish Piracies" and the power "to declare War"
are distinguishable from Congress's foreign commerce power because these
powers seem still to reside entirely with Congress.310 In other words, there are
no delegation issues associated with clauses ten and eleven because Congress
has not delegated its power as it has in the AECA. Obviously, a tool that
compensates for the executive use of delegated authority is unnecessary where
Congress has made no delegation.31'
303. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 682 (1988) (reasoning that a narrow
construction of a statute is necessary to save it from potential "constitutional infirmities").
304. See supra Part II (describing the use of arms exports as a policy tool in various
administrations).
305. See HENKiN, supra note 249, at 63 (describing the "generous" powers conferred upon
Congress in the Constitution).
306. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
307. Id. at cl. 10.
308. Id. at cl. l1.
309. Id. at cl. 4.
310. See HENKIN, supra note 249, at 68 ("The power of Congress over war and peace is
plenary."). But see id. (noting that the War Powers Resolution of 1973 raises some issues about
the President's war-making ability).
311. Another distinguishing characteristic of the power "to define and punish Piracies" is
that it "has been little used" in recent history, unlike Congress's foreign commerce power.
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The power "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization," however, is an
area in which some legislative powers are delegated to the Executive.312 Even
if this power cannot be distinguished in this respect, it can be distinguished
from the foreign commerce power because most decisions made pursuant to the
delegated "naturalization" powers are subject to judicial review.313 The
Executive has argued that "there is no judicial forum 3 14 for review of habeas
cases because there are several immigration statutes that explicitly preclude
review.315 The Supreme Court, however, held that there is a "strong
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action ... [and] a
clear statement of congressional intent '0 16 is necessary to overcome this
presumption. 1 7
A legislative veto is unnecessary (and unconstitutional) in the context of
"naturalization" powers because there is a presumption that the Executive's
discretion is checked by the judiciary.318  The presence of one of the
presumptive checks from the Chadha majority distinguishes Congress's power
over immigration from its delegated power to regulate the international trade of
defense articles. Therefore, of the four enumerated foreign affairs powers in
the Constitution, only the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations"
(more specifically, the power to regulate arms transfers), has been (1) delegated
to the Executive and (2) precluded from meaningful judicial review. As a
result, the hypothetical legislative veto is appropriate only for situations
implicating Congress's power to regulate arms transfers.
Not only can a definite line be drawn between Congress's power over
foreign commerce and its other enumerated powers but this Note contends that
another line can be drawn generally between foreign and domestic affairs.
HENKIN, supra note 249, at 68.
312. See 8 U.S.C § 1103(a)(1) (2006) ("The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be
charged with the administration and enforcement of this Chapter and all other laws relating to
the immigration and naturalization of aliens .... ).
313. See id. at § 1103 ("The district courts of the United States shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear all causes or claims arising from any action undertaken, or any decision
made, by the Secretary of Homeland Security pursuant to paragraph (1) .....
314. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297 (2001).
315. Id. at 297-98. Congress itself made the decision to preclude review in these statutes,
not the courts or an agency as is the case with ITAR.
316. Id. at 298.
317. See id. at 326 (holding that the district court retained habeas jurisdiction, in part
because there was insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of reviewability).
318. 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2004);see St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298 ("Forthe INS to prevail it must
overcome.., the strong presumption in favor ofjudicial review of administrative action ....").
INADEQUATE CHECKS AND BALANCES
Admittedly the line between the two is sometimes hazy,319 but in most cases the
distinction is clear. Congress delegates much of its power in domestic
affairs, 320 but the difference between delegated domestic authority and foreign
affairs power is that agency decisions made pursuant to domestic authority are
presumably reviewable. 321 Once again, the availability of the judicial check on
executive discretion renders the legislative veto unnecessary in matters of
delegated domestic affairs.
To summarize, this section argues that Chadha generally precludes the use
of the legislative veto. In instances, however, where power goes unchecked, as
is the case with DDTC's interpretation of § 129, "common sense and the
inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination 322 require a departure
from the formalistic rules prohibiting the legislative veto. The veto's use must
be judicious. It can apply only to the narrow situations that implicate
Congress's power to regulate arms transfers because all other decisions made
pursuant to delegated domestic powers are susceptible to judicial review, and
Congress's other foreign affairs powers have either not been delegated or are
reviewable by the courts. Therefore, the argument that one exception will
inevitably lead to the veto's wholesale reintroduction is a non-starter because
the legislative veto may apply only to the narrow and defined area of
congressional power described above.
4. The Veto Legislation Can Be Thoughtfully Designed to Avoid a
Presentment Problem
This Note's main purpose is to critique the political imbalance regarding
DDTC's interpretation of ITAR § 129, and the ineffectiveness of the checks
and balances designed to remedy similar situations.323 This Part's purpose is to
suggest that a legislative remedy, possibly in the form of a narrowly applied
319. See HENKIN, supra note 249, at 63 n.* (noting that some congressional foreign affairs
powers are thought to be both domestic and foreign, such as the power "'to establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization"') (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4).
320. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2004) (vesting the power to regulate radio and wire
communications in the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)); id § 402(a) (allowing for
judicial review of the FCC's orders and decisions).
321. Agency decisions made pursuant to delegated domestic powers are presumably
reviewable because they are not subject to the APA exception excluding from review "foreign
affairs function of the United States," nor will the majority of domestic affairs be subject to the
other exclusions in 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(1), 554(a) (2004).
322. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
323. See supra Part I (outlining the thesis of this Note).
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legislative veto, is the most appropriate solution, but the exact specifications
and structure of the legislative veto are beyond the scope of this Note. Before
concluding, however, a brief discussion of the legislative veto's construction is
worthwhile.
Because the general use of the legislative veto is at odds with
constitutional formalities, the mechanism should be used only as a last resort.
Thus, any use of the veto should be subsequent to committee hearings whose
purpose is to inform the appropriate officials of Congress's disapproval of the
State Department's misinterpretation. Congress already has the power to do
this, but lacks the significant threat of a veto in its back pocket. Perhaps the
mere threat of the veto will be enough to steer the State Department's
interpretations back on track.324
To remedy the case at hand, the legislative veto provision must give
Congress the ability to object to statutory language it observes being interpreted
or used in a manner that is inconsistent with Congress's wishes. Louis Fisher, a
renowned scholar of presidential and congressional powers, defines legislative
vetoes as "statutory provisions that delay an administrative action.., during
which time Congress may approve or disapprove without further presidential
involvement. " 325 Using this definition as a framework, this Note suggests that
the AECA have a veto provision that requires DDTC to submit its regulations
(along with formal guidance as to how the regulation is applied) to the foreign
affairs oversight committee in Congress. The committee, at that point, could
choose to accept or veto DDTC's interpretation. If Congress chose not to act
within a short period of time, then the agency's view would become binding.
This structure (as opposed to a veto provision that allows Congress to amend
regulations) does not threaten the Executive's independence because the
Executive retains control over the regulation's contents.326 The veto, if
exercised, would simply send the State Department and DDTC back to the
drawing board.327
The unicameral legislative veto in Chadha was struck down because it
violated the "presentment" and "bicameralism" requirements of Article 1.328
Any revived version of the legislative veto must address those two deficiencies.
324. See FISHER, supra note 266, at 212 (noting that Congress never used the veto power in
the AECA, but it was the threat of the veto that forced the Executive to reconsider the trade of
weapons).
325. Id. at 91.
326. See FISHER, supra note 266, at 98 (criticizing the Chadha court's argument that the
legislative veto threatens the Executive's independence).
327. See id. ("[A] legislative veto merely restored the status quo.').
328. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-52 (1983).
INADEQUATE CHECKS AND BALANCES
The "bicameralism" requirement 329 is the easiest deficiency to address. Any
viable legislative veto must ensure that its execution involve a vote in both
Houses. The Presentment Clause,330 on the other hand, is the requirement that
cut "the ground out from under all legislative vetoes. 331 Any legislative
mechanism that will effectively remedy the political imbalance must, however,
avoid the presidential veto or else the legislative veto becomes simply Article I
legislation.332
This Note raises a novel idea that is as fair as it is untested. Essentially,
the AECA would be amended in two ways. First, Congress would be granted
the legislative veto described above to execute in situations in which an agency
is effectively unchecked by the other two branches. Second, veto provisions
would include sunset clauses requiring reauthorization every four to six years.
The reauthorization process, obviously, would be subject to the Presentment
Clause and all other Article I requirements. This scheme would give Congress
the necessary check on DDTC's interpretation of statutory language, while also
providing the Executive its constitutionally required veto power (lest Congress
stray too far from the Executive's foreign policy objectives).
VII. Conclusion
Thirty years ago, Congress reasserted its constitutional authority to regulate
arms transfers333 because "[t]oo often in the past decisions [were] made with
respect to security assistance without the... concurrence of the Congress.
3 34
Today, our arms export policy has once again become unmoored from its
329. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill ... shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate .... ).
330. Id. ("Every Bill... [shall] before it become a Law, be presented to the President of
the United States .... ).
331. Legislative Veto Committee Hearing, supra note 267, at 54.
332. For an example of why an effective solution must avoid presentment in the context of
arms control, see, e.g., FISHER, supra note 266, at 214. After Chadha, the AECA provided only
for a joint resolution of disapproval, which does not have the force of law unless it is signed by
the President. Id. In 1986, Congress disapproved with a super-majority of an arms sale to
Saudi Arabia proposed by President Reagan. Id. Despite the widespread disapproval, the
President vetoed the resolution. Id. When the proposal went back to Congress (with a few
changes), it was met again with widespread disapproval, but it was one vote short in the Senate
of the two-thirds majority needed to override the veto. Id. As a result, the sale was executed
over the objections of nearly two-thirds of the members of Congress. Id.
333. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations").
334. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1144, at 13 (1976).
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constitutional foundations and unresponsive to congressional influence. An
absence of effective checks in the structure of arms export regulation allows the
Executive branch to operate unilaterally and with impunity. The lack of
fundamental constraints is particularly regrettable in the case of the State
Department's interpretation of§ 129.3, which perverts congressional intent and
would likely fail judicial review if review were available.
This imbalance of power not only flouts the basic principle that no branch
of government should go unchecked, 35 but it has also caused uncertainty
within the defense industry, delayed the licensing process, and threatened
important policy objectives abroad. Strains on the United States' defense
industry significantly affect some of the most volatile situations around the
globe: It is vital that the processes that control arms exports work with
maximum efficiency and clarity. Congress must, as it did thirty years ago,
reassert its power over the regulation and policy of arms exports. Recent
events, such as the creation of a Senate subcommittee to oversee the President's
use of warrantless surveillance 336 and the failure of the administration's plan to
handover port security to a Dubai firm,337 evidence Congress's ability and
newfound willingness to respond to the Executive's unilateral decision-making.
Will the political imbalance that plagues arms export control be next?
335. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) ("'There can be no liberty where the
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates' .... ")
(quoting Montesquieu).
336. See supra notes 277-80 and accompanying text (describing the congressional
response to the President's use of warrantless surveillance).
337. See Jonathan Weisman & Bradley Graham, Dubai Firm to Sell US. Port Operations:
Move to End Three- Week Dispute Comes After GOP Lawmakers, Defying Bush, Vowed to Kill
Deal, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2006, at AOl (chronicling the breakdown of the President's plan to
handover management of six U.S. ports).
